AKHTAR HAD PROVED THAT NOT ONLY WERE THE MUJAHIDEEN HOLDING THEIR OWN, BUT THAT VICTORY IN THE FIELD WAS, AFTER ALL THE SKEPTICISM, ATTAINABLE.

General Akhtar was a great believer in the use of the tactical offensive in the conduct of a guerrilla war. In this he was undoubtely correct, as no war can ever be won by purely defensive methods. He understood the need for the bold, aggressive, use of weapons, and of the need to achieve tactical surprise. Time and again these methods brought us success on the battlefield. It was Akhtar who devised the Mujahideen's offensive use of the multi or single barrelled rocket lauchers. With these weapons no worthwhile target inside Afghanistan was secure from attack. Except during the winter months the night sky above Kabul was criss-crossed by scores of rockets descending on the city from different directions. These tactics had the effect of creating a deep sense of insecurity in the minds of the Soviets and Afghans. They reacted by deploying more and more troops in static guard duties, thus reducing their ability to mount offensive operations. For them to adopt a purely defensive strategy would be to acknowledge defeat.

Akhtar's insistence on the offensive use of anti-aircraft weapons, particularly from late 1986 onwards with the Stinger Missile, was another key factor in the war gradually tilting in favour of the Mujahideen. His tactic of deploying these weapons around airfields in an ambush role, with highly mobile teams of firers, proved a huge success. In fact it was the introduction of the Stinger, coupled with its offensive use, that was I believe, crucial in convincing the Soviet authorities that they could never win the war. Our technique of deliberately exposing a tempting target to induce aircraft to attack, or retaliate, was one successful method used.

By early 1987 it was clear to us that the Soviets would not last much longer in Afghanistan. General Akhtar and I started serious discussions on what should be our operational strategy during, and particularly after, they had withdrawn. Of one thing Akhtar was certain, and events proved him correct, and this was as soon as the Soviets started to pull out the US would begin to cut back on the supply of arms to the Mujahideen. He was convinced that the Americans would reduce their support to ensure there was no outright Mujahideen military victory.

There comes a time in any guerrilla war when their commander has to assess whether the moment has arrived to go over to conventional offensive warfare - to meet the enemy in the open on equal terms, and achieve a conventional military victory. It is the final phase of a guerrilla struggle. The timing has to be exactly right otherwise, if the guerrillas are defeated in a set-piece battle, their cause may be set back for months, even years. Examples of taking this decision too soon are General Giap in the early fifties against the French in Indo-China, and the North Vietnamese Tet offensive in Vietnam, in 1968. Although the guerrillas eventually triumphed in both cases, their premature conventional offensives were costly defeats. General Akhtar's judgement was that when, or if, the Soviets quit Afghanistan the Mujahideen should not try to defeat the remaining Afghan Communists by conventional means. He did not believe that they would ever be ready for this type of warfare, indeed he was certain that victory could be won without recourse to it.

In accordance with his wishes we agreed a continuance of the policy of death by a thousand cuts, but with increased emphasis on strangling Kabul. There should be no distractions from this primary goal, all other operations being judged on their effect on achieving collapse in the capital. The city was to be surrounded and attacked by rockets from all directions. Kabul airport was to be rendered unusable by continuous attacks from the Koh-i-Safi base to the north-east. A series of blocking positions were to be established across the main line of communication. the Salang Highway, between the city and the Soviet border. Their objective was to halt, or critically disrupt, the flow of logistic support that would surely continue from the Soviet Union after their troops had left. These ambushes were to be concentrated in the area of the Salang Tunnel, where the highway crosses the watershed of the Hindu Kush. This was Kabul's choke point. If the enemy sallied out from Kabul or elsewhere to open up their supply lines, so much the better as they would present further ambush opportunities. All other operations in Afghanistan would be secondary, and designed to contain and fix, not assault and capture, the remaining main Afghan garrisons. Akhtar believed, and I strongly concurred, that such a strategy would defeat Najibullah regime within a few months.

As it turned out, our discussions and planning were prematurely cut short as in March, 1987, the Jehad lost General Akhtar. After all those long years. after seeing the Mujahideen developed from a ragtag, ill-trained and ill-equipped force, to a vast guerrillas army that had brought the Soviet bear to its knees. Akhtar was deprived, by promotion, of witnessing victory.