HE UNDERSTOOD THE NEED FOR THE BOLD, AGGRESSIVE, USE OF WEAPONS, AND OF THE NEED TO ACHIEVE TACTICAL SURPRISE, TIME AND AGAIN THESE METHODS BROUGHT US SUCCESS ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

General Akhtar set himself extremely high standards, perhaps too high as he was seldom satisfied with his own performance. He was often apprehensive that he would be found wanting; that he would not live up to the standards he had set himself. He worked all hours to achieve his aim, for eight years he shouldered incredible responsibilities in the face of not only military opposition on the battlefield, but mounting political and personal opposition at home. In the end he achieved all his goals, except the last - to see an ‘Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’.

His tremendous achievements were not recognized during his life, indeed part of the reason for his removal from ISI just as victory was in sight, was to ensure that he did not receive that recognition and fame. He was a great organizer, and as such put ISI on a modern footing, developing it into an efficient intelligence organization that is now recognized as one of the leading such organizations in the world.

In 1980 Akhtar had started with virtually nothing, but by the time I joined ISI in 1983, it was not only supplying the war, but had instituted training for the Mujahideen, was sending advisory teams of ISI men into Afghanistan, and had devised a strategy to fight a rapidly expanding guerrilla war. ISI continued td grow, in fact during my four years its establishment was boosted twice. During 1984 the director of the CIA, William Casey, visited ISI, and personally congratulated Akhtar on the performance of the Mujahideen, together with the logistics and training system that he had set up. It was this visit of Mr. Casey, and his subsequent report back in the US, that directly led to the doubling of the American military budget for the Jehad in 1985. Akhtar had proved that not only were the Mujahideen holding their own, but that victory in the field was, after all the skepticisms, attainable.

Aside from Mr. Casey, who appreciated Akhtar’s competence, he faced many problems with the Americans and the CIA. Perhaps understandably, the US felt that, if they were ‘paying the piper’, they should also, ‘call the tune’. In other words the CIA, and senior US government officials, pressed Akhtar and myself to be allowed to decide who got the arms, how much they received, what targets the Mujahideen should attack, and demanded that American instructors train the Mujahideen. None of these things ever happened while Akhtar was Director-General. With some of the sophisticated weapon systems, such as the Stinger anti-aircraft missile (which we eventually received in late 1986), US trainers trained Pakistani Army instructors, but never Mujahideen.

There were two fundamental reasons why Akhtar never allowed Americans to become directly involved in the Jehad. Firstly, to do so would have meant giving truth to Soviet propaganda that the war was not a Jehad, but an extension of US foreign policy, with Afghan fighting Afghan on behalf of the two superpowers. To fight in a Jehad was our most powerful force for unity among the Mujahideen, if this could be undermined the shaky Alliance would collapse, and operations in the field would degenerate into infighting. if the US did more than supply the money and buy the arms, if they became involved inside Pakistan with the prosecution of the war, we put at risk unity, and without unity we could never win. Akhtar never lost sight to this, and was totally inflexible in rebuffing the continuous American urgings to be allowed to get involved.

The second reason for keeping Americans out was that the CIA, who were the ones who would have taken over training, logistics, and operational matters, were mostly incompetent in these fields. It was our experience that CIA operatives, with the exception of some of the middle level training staff who were ex-military, had no idea how to fight a guerrilla war. Their methods were clumsy, unrealistic, and often totally unprofessional. This was not really surprising as they were not military men, they had no relevant experience, and above all they did not understand the Afghans. In short, to have let them loose among the Mujahideen would have courted strategic (loss of unity) and tactical (no idea how to conduct an Afghan Guerrilla war) disasters. Akhtar contributed immeasurably to the Jehad by keeping our American friends well away from the battlefield. I would stress that he was the only man able to do this. Even the president was under pressure to give the US a free hand, but it was Akhtar’s strength of character that prevailed. Another matter that rankled the Americans in their dealings with Akhtar and ISI was that they became convinced that we favoured the Islamic fundamentalist parties and commanders in our allocation of arms. Certainly Akhtar sought to win the war in order to see an Islamic government replace the Communist one, but he knew that could never be achieved without a military victory in the field. To gain such a victory necessitated effective operations, sustained operations against key targets, and above all joint operations in which commanders cooperated irrespective of their political beliefs. Althtar never lost sight of the basic fact that to put an Islamic government in Kabul meant a military victory first. As a professional soldier of great experience he translated this into giving weapons, ammunitions, and supplies to those parties or commanders who would perform successfully in the field.

There was another related matter on which Akhtar and the CIA did not see eye to eye, which also involved the distribution of arms. They advocated giving weapons direct to the commanders in the field, by passing the political parties at Peshawar. This was the method that Akhtar had been compelled to use at the start of the Jehad before the creation of the Alliance. It had resulted in confusion and corruption. Having set up the Alliance, having achieved a modicum of unity, Akhtar was adamant (and rightly so) that arms and supplies must be channeled through the parties, and that they must take on responsibility for internal allocation. The Americans’ view was that combat effectiveness would be enhanced by giving the supplies direct to the men whom they wanted to use them. In the short term, or for a special operation, this could work but even then the arms should be given from the commander’s party allocation. In the long term or done on a large scale, this method was badly flawed. How could control be maintained when giving supplies direct to hundreds of commanders? It was difficult enough distributing to seven parties; In practice this system invariably led to infighting, looting, corruption, and chaos

much the same situation as exists today when this system operates. Akhtar was absolutely right to resist it.

In practice some 70 percent of logistic support was given to the fundamentalist parties, but no single party got more than 20 percent. The US believed that this was done for political reasons. It was not. As the person responsible for several years for the detailed allocation of supplies to the parties I can vouch for the fact that it was done strictly on the basis of operational effectiveness. Although I had to implement this policy Akhtar kept a close eye on what was going on.

Akhtar could be disarmingly being well mannered and accommodating in discussions, while at the same time not breaking his principles. He was always sympathetic in his approaches to the Mujahideen concerning their problems. He spent countless hours in complex and emotional arguments with the Afghan leaders without offending them, without causing a breach in their relationships with each other, and at the same time without compromising his own position. This was a major asset of his which few could equal, as nobody is more sensitive to slight or insult than the Afghan.

Even the CIA found it hard to find fault with his dedication and professionalism. Few in the US or Pakistan knew of the close working relationship that developed between Akhtar and Casey, the two directors of their respective country’s intelligence organizations. They worked together in harmony, and in an atmosphere of mutual trust. I never heard Casey contradict Akhtar during their discussions of the means of conducting the war. Once or twice at conferences, when Akhtar put forward the case for a particular weapon being needed, a member of Casey’s staff would interject with arguments against it. Casey always overruled him, saying, ‘He (Akhtar) is completely involved in this war and certainly knows better than anyone else about his requirements. We simply have to support him’. It was a great blow to the Jehad when Casey died.

I certainly found that, after I had satisfied him as to my own competence, Akhtar was not a difficult man to work for. Once he had gained confidence in his subordinates he seldom intervened in the routine day to day matters. He allowed me to get on with my job, and he judged my ability by the results achieved. He had his own views on how to conduct a guerrilla war, but if a particular tactic or system failed to work on the battlefield it was always modified. He never made the mistake of reinforcing failure. He made up his mind by seeking advice, listening to arguments, and sometimes thinking aloud. He had the ability of sowing the seed of an idea in another person’s mind, so that when it germinated it became as much their idea as his. He certainly never forced me to undertake any action that I did not believe in because he knew that if he did it would not be implemented with the conviction so necessary for success.

I was certainly grateful to Akhtar for the confidence he had in me, and the leeway he allowed me to get on with the job in hand. He had the ability, so often lacking in senior officers, of being able to delegate. He would normally hold a full scale operational conference every quarter to review military operations, and discuss and decide upon plans for the coming months. Once the strategy had been decided at the meeting he would not interfere with my conduct of either operations or logistics. He would, of course, observe and monitor progress. If things did not go according to his wishes he would ask the reasons, but he would never jump in and take direct control. At that stage, with an operation actually in progress he saw his role as being to support, advise, or assist. A difficult attitude for a person in his position, with ultimate responsibility for the war, to take. This good working relationship took about a year to establish fully as I was, at the start, very green and inexperienced in comparison with Akhtar who had been fighting the Jehad for four years by the time I joined ISI As an example would cite the distribution of the SA-7 (surface to air missile). Initially I had to get his concurrence before issuing it to any party or commander. Later this was not necessary. Even with the critical Stingers Akhtar left me a free hand, provided that I got their deployment areas agreed at his operational conference.

At times he could show genuine emotion and sympathy for the suffering of others. In early 1986 I learned with deep concern that a large number of Shaheeds’ families were living in miserable conditions in some of the refugee camps, with virtually no support of any kind. Even their parties which had a moral responsibility to assist them, appeared to have forgotten their plight. Their pathetic living conditions, and lack of concern with their welfare by the parties, was having a detrimental effect on the Jehad. Understandably, Mujahideen were becoming reluctant to come forward to fight when they saw how families of Shaheeds were neglected. This situation was exploited by Soviet and Afghan agents (mostly women) in the camps, whose task was to undermine the resolve of families to support the war. They ridiculed the Mujahideen leadership for their seeming lack of interest in the conditions of the families, while at the same time spreading rumours about the corruption and dishonesty of the leaders. They emphasized allegations of how most of the leaders were living in luxurious villas in Peshawar or Islamabad, and were getting rich at the cost of the Jehad while the basic needs of the Shaheeds families were not met.

When I informed Akhtar of the seriousness of this situation he was deeply distressed. For the first time I saw tears in his eyes. He immediately summoned a meeting of the Alliance for the following day, at which be spoke at length, and with great feeling. Part of the problem was a lack of funds as if the parties donated, say $20, to each family every month, there would be nothing left for the Jehad. Akhtar could see both sides of the problem and released additional funds from ISI reserves. Thereafter he never forgot them, and would frequently inquire of me the latest position, or discuss ways and means of assisting.

There was another matter that always concerned me with the prosecution of the Jehad, and one over which in my early days I had a number of lengthy arguments with General Akhtar. This involved the total lack of any publicity of the Mujahideen’s efforts in the war. As a result details of their achievements, their successes, their sacrifices, never reached the public in Pakistan. Akhtar himself always shunned the limelight so I could understand his personal reluctance to meet the media, but surely the activities of the Mujahideen merited recognition by a wider audience than 1SI. I urged the general to use the media to this effect. For months I kept bringing the matter up, pressing him to use all the means at our disposal to gain the attention, and hopefully support, of the Pakistani people for the Jehad, and indeed for the Afghan refugees. He appeared immovable. At last, after I had been particularly vocal he confided to me,

‘The successes of the Afghan Jehad have resulted in professional jealousies against my person. As a result, I have created an army of enemies. Any further attempt to project the cause of the Afghan Jehad would be perceived as my own projection because I and Afghanistan are considered as one entity. This projection would draw violent reactions against me and the Jehad and would hurt the cause. Also, President Zia will not tolerate it, considering it as my personal projection.’

Jamat-A-Islami was the only political party in Pakistan which actively supported the Afghan Jehad. Their leaders had developed close and intimate relations with the fundamentalists and Hekmatyar was their favourite. They regularly held public meetings in various parts of the country in order to muster public opinion in Pakistan in favour of the Jehad.

I am certain Akhtar fully understood the dangers of failing to counter the enemy’s constant subversion and propaganda against the Jehad in Pakistan, but it seems he was powerless to refute it publicly. The Mujahideen and the refugees were blamed for all the violent crimes in the NWFP and Baluchistan; they were accused of gun running and attacking the local population; they were blamed for stealing the land and taking jobs and trade that belonged to Pakistanies; and they were alleged to be responsible for the influx of drugs being smuggled into the country. KHAD and RAW agents actively fomented discontent among both the refugees and the local people. Often they would plant bombs which killed many innocent victims, then blame the Afghans and the war. We knew that most of these charges were false, but we were unable to mount a campaign to counter them. For example, the weapons were smuggled in mainly by Pakistani tribal Maliks (chiefs) in Connivance with the Afghan Communist government, while all the drug factories were in Pakistan. The majority of the drug traffickers were Pakistanis, many making millions of dollars in this dirty game. Regrettably the true culprits were never exposed. With the president’s indifference and with so many enemies outside of 1ST, Akhtar could do little in the field of public relations.

It was the same story with Soviet atrocities. For some reason I could never really fathom, international journalists ignored the terrible crimes perpetrated by Soviet, troops in Afghanis The systematic slaughter of women and children, the extensive use of torture, the bayoneting of children, and the rape of women in helicopter and then’ the throwing of their victims out, are the type of outrage they committed. No effort was made to mobilise public opinion against the Soviet Union in the free world for these terrible acts. Village after village was razed to the ground. A deliberate Soviet tactic was to render millions homeless, to destroy their homes and Crops, and to indiscriminately scatter millions of mines - yet the headlines of the worlds newspapers never mentioned what was going on. There was some inexplicable indifference which neither I or General Akhtar could understand or redress.

There was, however, one area of international relations in which General Akhtar had a highly beneficial influence. This was in securing massive financial support for the Jehad from Saudi Arabia. He was the key figure in convincing the Saudi government to back the war. For every US dollar that was supplied by the Americans to the CIA’s arms buying fund, the Saudis equalled it. Hundreds of millions of dollars were given by Saudi Arabia, and her generous assistance is what keeps the Mujahideen in the field today when American aid has been so severely curtailed. Other rich Arab individuals from all over the Middle East have also contributed very substantial sums to particular parties. Prince Turkie, the then head of the Saudi intelligence service, was a frequent visitor to Islamabad, and his relations with Akhtar were excellent. Both believed fervently in the importance of an Islamic brotherhood which ignored territorial frontiers. It is significant to note that the Mujahideen have never forgotten their debt to Saudi Arabia.

Prince Turkie Al-Faisal was the official representative of the Saudi government on Afghan Jehad. He used to visit Pakistan secretly at least twice a year to discuss the Afghan situation with General Akhtar and the Afghan leaders. I always remembered him as a man who was exceptionally kind, gracious and thoughtful towards the Afghan cause. Although his character was formed by his aristocratic upbringing yet he was the most humble and modest Arab prince I ever met. His education and experience in the West made him completely free of the common Arab prejudices towards the non Arabs. Prince Turkie and General Akhtar had developed a special liking for each other as a result, Saudi government provided full support to the Afghan cause.

With China also, Akhtar was influential in prevailing upon that government to provide a large and expanding supply of arms and ammunition. Akhtar met all the senior, visiting foreign delegations, briefed them on the war and the problems to be overcome. Over the years he became to be held in high esteem for his professional competence and strength of character. It seemed at times that he had taken over the role of our foreign ministry with regard to enlisting support for the Afghan Jehad. I should point out here that as Director- General of 1ST, Akhtar had a host of other national and international duties and commitments apart from the Afghan war. ISI is a vast and sensitive organization, whose head faced with multiple and. complex problems often requiring quick and accurate responses. It is a place where mistakes are never forgiven, where a wrong decision can cause incalculable harm to t.he national interest. Two incidents will illustrate my point.

One of Akhtar’s responsibilities was internal security, which involved, guarding the government and the president from subversion, sabotage, or rebellion. On the 6th July, 1980, a huge anti govrnment demonstration threatened to get out of control. The demonstrators had occupied the Civil Secretariat and forced the closure of the Central Government Offices, paralyzing the government machinery. The civil administration had failed to contain the situation, and senior government representatives who had tried to intervene had been rejected. At this stage General Akhtar volunteered to defuse the situation. A small team from ISI, working under his personal directions, was able to bring about an amicable settlement without recourse to violence. Later, Akhtar was able to prevent a coup attempt from developing against president Zia, by rounding up the suspects just prior to the attack, which was to be made during a military parade at which the president would take the salute. It is of interest to note that a similar plot to kill President Sadat of Egypt succeeded.

I would estimate that although General Akhtar was only able to devote half his time to the Afghan war, there was never a day that passed without his finding out what was happening. I found at times that it was difficult, with his tight schedule, to meet him for discussions: But if he could not see me he would always talk on the telephone to find out what it was I needed’ to speak about, and its urgency. If I did not ask for a m for a few days he would call me to check what was happening, and ask why I had not contacted him. At night was the normal time for him to speak with me to see if there was anything he needed to do for the Jehad, or to talk over the military or logistic situation. Whenever I was not available on the telephone he would get most upset. This routine was followed whenever I was, in Islamabad, Quetta, Peshawar, or elsewhere, throughout my three-and-a-half years with him.