Without doubt one of General Akhtar's greatest contributions to the success of the Jehad was in the field of Mujahideen unity. The Afghan is a fractious individual, with inborn tribal loyalties and jealousies. He is bound by his code of conduct, which demands both vengeance and hospitality. He is by nature and upbringing fiercely independent, and deeply suspicious of others not of his clan or tribe. Afghans living within a few kilometres of each other in adjacent valleys are often bitter enemies, locked into a blood feud that has perhaps continued for generations. While they are hardy and courageous fighters with an affinity for weapons, the greatest difficulty is in getting them to cooperate. Today, infighting and political feuding are out of control, with the result that the Jehad has collapsed. Even without the Soviets the likelihood of a military victory has receded to the extent of virtual invisibility. But it was not always so.

Akhtar appreciated that to win a guerrilla war on such a scale, over such a huge area, operations must be coordinated, they must be selective, an they must be carried out in the spirit of cooperation. Joint operations between rival groupings or parties must be achieved. His major achievement in the field was to get the Seven Party Alliance established by President Zia in 1984. Even Zia had to threaten to get the Mujahideen's political leaders to join the Alliance, but join they did, and Akhtar made it a fundamental part of his strategy for the prosecution of the war. He attached top priority to working with, and through, the Alliance. He personally attended conferences with them, he got to know the individual leaders, not as a commanding general, but as an equal. Over the months and years they grew to trust and respect him. While many still showed a reluctance to discuss their problems or grievances with each other, they all felt they could turn to Akhtar. They knew his judgement was sound, they knew he stood by his principles, they knew his faith in Islam was as strong as theirs, and they knew that his sole ambition was a victorious Jehad.

It was through the alliance political parties that Akhtar controlled the campaign effort. All Mujahideen commanders in the field were required to join a party. As it was only through the parties that arms were distributed, failure to join meant no weapons, which in turn led to loss of a following, prestige, and face. All very serious matters to an Afghan. We allocated arms to the parties on a basis of operational effectiveness, but as our critics claimed (including the US and CIA) on the basis of Islamic fundamentalism. Akhtar laid down a clear policy, which was followed. A party got weapons allocated not on the basis of size or religious fervour but purely on operational efficiency. Did the party have an efficent internal distribution system? Did its commanders cooperate with others in the field, or were there too many instances of feuding? Did their commander operate against cirtical strategic targets, or were they confined to areas of little importance or activity? And, above all, were their operations successful; did they kill the enemy or destroy his vehicles, aircraft or infrastructure? These were the sort of questions Akhtar and his ISI staff asked.

Akhtar's standing instruction to me was that I must arrange a meeting with one of the party leaders with him every week, and a conference with all seven at least monthly. Regrettably, due to other pressures this schedule was not always maintained. However, whenever he had a moment to spare he devoted it to enhancing unity of the Jehad. He rightly regarded it as a war winning factor, of far greater importance than a tactical victory on the battlefield. He referred to unity among the political leaders as 'strategic unity'. He saw strategic unity as his responsibility, while tactical unity was mine.

With individual leaders he would mostly discuss the military situation in Afghanistan, and their logistic difficulties. He would listen attentively to their views, which frequently involved complaints against the Pakistani police, provincial government, or the Afghan Refugee Commissionerate. He would always advise on cooperation, stressing the importance of Kabul. Meetings were always conducted in a friendly, informal manner, with the general giving the leaders their due respect. Nevertheless, he could be firm with them if necessary. While he never interfered with their internal party affairs, he vented his displeasure at corruption, the sale of arms, feuding, or inefficiency which affected the Jehad.

He had a happy knack with the leaders. He enjoyed their confidence and was, more than anybody else, responsible for keeping them together as a team for all those years. Sometimes I found leaders bitter and angry with him over a particular issue before a meeting, but afterwards they had lost their annoyance and seemed fully satisfied. Akhtar enjoyed meeting these men as he was fond of them, and appreciated their opinions.

Although he never revealed his personal likes or preferences to the leaders, he could not hide his feelings from me. There is no doubt he had a special liking for Sayaf, Khalis, Gul Badin, and Pir Effendi. Invariably he exchanged jokes with Khalis who has a good sense of humour.

One of the more sensitive problems that was often raised by the leaders to the general concerned the conditions and corruption in the refugee camps. Akhtar was their forthright spokesman in confronting both the civil and military authorities on these matters, but although he brought the complaints and grievances directly to the president it was very seldom that action was taken against the culprits. I recall protesting vehemently to him about the racketeering within the Afghan Refugee Commissionerate, and how it was adversely affecting the moral of the Mujahideen. Withholding registration documents, which entitled the refugee family to rations, unless bribed; not issuing certain foodstuffs, but keeping them for personal sale on the black-market, were but two of the common corrupt practices that were prevalent. I felt that the general was not keeping the president informed, and insisting on a proper clean up of these camps' administration. To this Akhtar replied, with deep emotion, 'Believe it I have never spared anyone about whom I had good evidence. But it is the prerogative of the president to take disciplinary action. I am simply helpless'.

Then he narrated to me a particular incident involving himself:
'I was offered over two million rupees as my commission of all the vehicles we have just purchased [for ISI use in moving supplies], and the gentleman who made the offer confided to me that every head of department, civil or military, gets this commission, as his right from him'.

Akhtar had refused, telling to give extra vehicles for the Jehad instead of his commission.

The problem was that Akhtar was too honest to beat the system. President Zia seemed to accept corruption as a way of life in Pakistan, and would not sack individuals for this offence. Akhtar always reported what was going on, never overlooking anybody including his own staff, but Zia never reacted. The only sure way of his removing senior generals or civil servants was if he perceived they were a threat to his position or reputation.

One thing is certain, Akhtar never courted favours or popularity. He knew full well that as Director-General of ISI he was a hated man. that most of his peers and seniors within the military regarded him with envy or fear. The cause of the Jehad had to be fought within Pakistan as well as inside Afghanistan. At times the Pakistan Army, the foreign office, and the provincial governments of the NWFP and Baluchistan, all opposed ISI and tried to sabotage its efforts to prosecute the war. Personality clashes, professional jealousies, and a lack of information on what was happeining in Afghanistan, all combined to widen the gulf that existed between Akhtar and ISI, and the rest of our government. This additional burden never deterred him. Of course he had the great advantage of the trust of the president, without that he could not have survived. For almost eight years he remained in his critical post, being passed over for promotion several times because he was considered vital for the success of the Jehad. To Zia he was indispensable so long as the enemy remained unbeaten. Akhtar and Zia worked intimately together on matters of great national and international importance. The president developed a strong confidence in Akhtar based on his competence, integrity, and loyalty. In the end of course, Zia promoted and removed Akhtar from this critical job, but I will deal with this later.