The mastermind behind the military strategy of the Afghan Jehad from the start was General Akhtar. As time went on he was usually content to allow his subordinates, such as myself, to solve the day to day tactical, training, or logistic problems, but he retained a firm grip on strategical matters, or the Mujahideen's political affairs. At the outset this had not been possible. Akhtar had to devote his energies to tackling a host of difficulties to gear up ISI to support a large scale guerrilla war from nothing. For the first six months, until the US, China, Saudi Arabia and others came in with cash or weapons, Pakistan was on its own. Akhtar had to create within ISI an organisation capable of handling the supply, training, and operations of tens of thousands of Mujahideen who were at that stage completely disorganized, ill-equipped, ill-trained, and lacked any form of coordinated strategic direction.

The first requirement was weapons. Akhtar scoured various ordnance depots of the Pakistan Army seeking discarded .303 rifles, ammunition, old British anti-tank mines, and some Chinese manufactured shoulder-fired rocket launchers. Next, lines of communication, a 'pipeline', had to be established to get the supplies to those who needed to use the items in Afghanistan. The afghan Bureau within ISI at first used to transport the arms forward by night, even closing down completely during daytime in the early days. Gradually more and more individual Mujahideen commanders and parties found their way onto the supply list, and the system got off the ground in a makeshift fashion. Such was the start of a 'pipeline' that was eventually to expand to a capacity of 1000 tons a week by 1986.

The overall military strategy designed to drive the Soviets out was the classic guerrilla one of death by a thousand cuts. General Akhtar never once sought to confront the enemy in a large scale conventional battle. He appreciated that ambushes, assassinations, attack on supply convoys, bridges, pipelines, and airfields, with the avoidance of setpiece battles was the way to win the war. At the start emphasis was placed on the need to strengthen the Mujahideen along with Durand Line (Pak-Afghan border). This was partly a necessity for the Mujahideen for the easy distribution of supplies, and partly for the security of the Pakistan frontier region, which was slowly built up into the guerrila's main base of supply area. As the war progressed, and the logistic flow increased, so activities deeper inside Afghanistan were stepped p intil active operations were being conducted in all 29 provinces.

For General Akhtar the key to victory was Kabul. His favourite expression when addressing the Mujahideen leaders was, 'Kaubul must burn'. His great ambition, which tragically he was unable to fulfill, was that after the Soviet defeat he would be able to visit Kabul and offer prayer to Allah for freeing the city from His enemies. Akhtar appreciated Kabul's significance to Afghanistan and to the Jehad. Kabul, as the capital, is the hub of political, educational, economic, diplomatic, and military activity. Within its confines are the government ministries, the university and technical colleges, foreign embassies, and the headquarters of the Afghan Army. From Radio Kabul, and the television studios, the ruling regime can manipulate the news, disseminate propaganda, and issue its decrees.

All roads in Afghanistan eventually lead to Kabul. It sits at the centre of a wheel, whose spokes are the roads and valley fanning out in all directions. To the north the Salang highway takes traffic to the Amu river, and the Panjsher valley penetrates the Hindu Kush. In the east Route 1, carries the traveller alongside the Kabul river, through Jalalabad, and over the Khyber Pass to Peshawar. Several lesser roads to the south-east reach the passes over the mountains into the Parachinar peninsular, and via Gardez and Khost, to Miran Shah in Pakistan. The long 'ring road', built by the Americans, leads south to Gazni, Kandahar, and, eventually, to Herat some 600 kilometres west of Kabul. Even to the immediate west of the city numerous lesser trails and valleys wriggle their way into the mass of mountains that form the Hazarajat. Akhtar knew that as long as a communist government controlled Kabul it controlled the nerve centre of the country. To win the war he understood that not only must the Soviets withdraws, but their Afghan puppets must be ejected from Kabul. This was always his primary military objective. Only if Kabul fell would the Jehad have succeeded, and Akhtar would never let us forget this. It was his obsession.

With this in mind Akhtar would always insist that Mujahideen commanders who were operating around Kabul got priority with regard to both training and heavy weapons. In practice this latter meant 107mm rocket launchers, first the Chinese multi (12)-barrel variety, and later the single barrel type which was our improvisation, manufactured by the Chinese, to reduce the weight. Our tactics were to train as many commanders as possible in stand-off rocket attacks, brief them as to the targets in the city, supply the weapons, and give them their missions. The aim was to keep up the pressure on Kabul throughout the year. The airfield, roads leading into the city, particularly the Salang highway which was the Soviets lifeline to the Amu, were subjected to frequent ambushing. Inside the city military and communist government targets were selected for rocket attacks, while acts of sabotage or assassination were undertaken against installations and individuals. Kabul was at the centre of Akhtar's strategy, but he also kept a close eye on the tactics we used to implement it.

Under Akhtar's leadership the support for the Jehad was gradually increased so that bythe mid-1980's tens of thousands of tons of arms and ammunition were moved by ISI to the Mujahideen via their party warehouses. Similarly tens of thousands of guerrilas, with their commanders, came to Pakistan for training. From 1980 until 1987, Pakistan Army teams from ISI went into Afghanistan to advise and assist the Mujahideen on operations. With the consent of the president Akhtar initiated this highly covert and highly important assistance, although the detailed planning was left to the brigadier in charge of the Afghan Bureau.

When I took over the Bureau in late 1983 I felt somewhat overawed by the size of the task and the reputation of General Akhtar. I had my doubts as to whether I would meet his high standards. The first six months were extremely difficult as I knew the general was watching me closely. On one occasion Akhtar rang me up only five minutes after office hours had stated and demanded the stock position of SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles. Fortunately, it was my habit to insist on stock figures being on my desk first thing every day, so I was able to tell him at once. Then he asked me whether I was in the office or at home (for security reasons all calls of Akhtar were put through his operators so I could have been at either). On my confirmation that I was in my office Akhtar said, 'I do not expect you to remember the exact figures. Please re-check. I want the exact figures in five minutes', and hung up. I called for the ledger to re-check and telephoned Akhtar to give him precisely the same figures. He was very skeptical until I explained my system. Akhtar certainly kept everybody on their toes. Often he would fire off unexpected questions at his staff to test them. Woebegone the officer who responded with the words 'I think'. Whenever I was out of Islamabad, which was frequently, my staff would be on tenderhooks. Invariably he would ask my deputy responsible for logistics about an operational matter, and vice versa. Sometimes this caught them out as they could not answer his queries. They would receive a verbal blasting for their ignorance. On my return I too would be told off for my officers 'inefficiency'.

One thing he could not abide was any attempt to bluff him. To be caught out bluffing the Director-General was infinitely worse than to be found ignorant. Bluffing smacked of dishonesty, and this he cuold not tolerate. A small personal incident will illustrate this point. He rang me up once to inquire the whereabouts of one of the Mujahideen party leaders. I replied immediately that, 'He is in Islamabad'.  Probably he thought I was bluffing because, his next question was 'Can I see him in an hour?. 'Yes Sir, he was in his house a few minutes ago when I spoke to him on the telephone, but I will check and confirm with you'. Within two minutes I had confirmed his availability, but Akhtar declined to see him on the pretext that something important had come up. I do not wish to create the impression that General Akhtar was always hard or unfeeling. Certainly as a highly professional soldier he would not tolerate lazy. dishonest, or inefficient subordinates, but he could be kind and humane as well. On one occasion the child of one of my staff officers had to undergo a series of operations spread over several years so he requested that his posting to ISI be extended, or he receive another job in Rawalpindi, on compassionate grounds. Not only did the general get his tenure extended, but he spoke personally to the medical authorities to find out if the child would need specialist treatment overseas.