AT THE OUTSET AKHTAR WAS VIRTUALLY ALONE IN THINKING HE COULD DRIVE THE SOVIETS OUT OF AFGHANISTAN.

General Akhtar was the architect of the Afghan Jehad. It was he who advocated Pakistani participation, it was he who devised the overall military strategy, and it was he who supervised its implementation so skillfully that the Mujahideen defeated a superpower.

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in late December, 1979, President Zia immediately sent for his Director-General of ISI. He wanted answers to many questions, he wanted to know how he (Pakistan) should react. Zia was a military man, and valued the advise of his generals. On this occasion he turned to Akhtar, the military chief of his national intelligence organization, for opinions and assessment.

The President realized that Pakistan faced a highly dangerous situation. To the east were 800 million hostile Hindus, while now, to the west, the Red Army had occupied Mghamstan, so the likelihood of Pakistan being squeezed out of existence between. the two enemies was a real possibility. Not only that, but Zia’s personal following inside Pakistan was, in some respects, shaky. His authority was based not on popular votes, but on the military, who governed with the use of military laws and decrees. Zia was the Chief Martial Law Administrator Internationally he had recently provoked worldwide consternation and condemnation by executing the former primer, minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto He felt isolated and’ threatened. In these circumstances the situation in Afghanistan took on added importance, how Pakistan reacted would be critical, not just for the country, but also for its president. Zia required from General Akhtar an ‘appreciation of the situation’ on a national scale, and he needed it quick.

 Such an appreciation is a military planning paper, a logical, step by step examination of a given situation, where all relevant factors are considered, along with likely enemy objectives or reactions, to produce a recommended course of action, and an outline plan .to achieve it. General Akhtar prepared a detailed presentation on the situation as he saw it.

Akhtar and his staff had studied all aspects of the situation. In addition to examining the military geography of Afghanistan, its communications, and the layout of the border area (Durand Line), they evaluated the Afghan people. Akhtar was convinced that their warrior background, their historical tradition of prickly independence, their fortitude and stamina, coupled with the compelling moral force of a Jehad, would combine to produce an unbeatable guerrilla army if properly directed and trained. The ‘appreciation’ also covered politico- strategic matters, such as Soviet global commitments, the prevailing Iran situation, the US interests in the region, and India’s likely reaction. His recommendation was that Pakistan should support the Jehad. He argued that not only was Afghanistan Pakistan’s front line, but that with the Communists in control there the odds for further. territorial expansion into Pakistan through Baluchistan were dramatically increased. Further, and of equal, if not greater significance, Islam was under attack. Akhtar considered that if Zia was to covertly support the Afghan’ resistance in a massive guerrilla war the Soviets could be halted, even rolled back. He believed that Afghanistan could be made into another Vietnam, with the Soviets in the shoes of the Americans. He urged Zia to take the military option. It would mean Pakistan secretly supporting the guerrillas with money, arms, ammunition, training, and operational advice. Most importantly it would entail offering the border areas of the NWFP and Baluchistan as a sanctuary for both refugees and guerrillas. Akhtar was well aware that for such a campaign to succeed a safe haven, a secure base, from which men and munitions could be channeled into Afghanistan was of paramount importance.

General Akhtar had recognized the potential of the situation, and from the beginning he had the courage to advocate taking on the world’s second most powerful superpower on the battlefield. President Zia agreed with him. It would be a Jehad against Communist infidels; it would be Pakistan’s first line of defense in the west; and it would regain for him some of his lost international esteem. That religious, strategic, and political factors all seemed to point in the same direction was indeed an encouraging circumstance. Akhtar’s conviction that, provided the Soviets were not goaded into outright invasion, it was a sound military proposition clinched the matter. Pakistan would back the Jehad - covertly.

The president’s instruction to Akhtar was that he should give him two years in which to consolidate his position in Pakistan, and internationally. To be more precise he told Akhtar that, ‘The water in Afghanistan must boil at the right temperature’. For eight years Akhtar skillfully followed his orders. Although at times the temperature rose sharply and threatened to boil, such as when we conducted operations inside the Soviet Union, it never actually spilled over. Throughout the campaign it required considerable skill on Akhtar’s part to so apply military pressure that it did not provoke a direct and open conflict between the USSR and Pakistan. In the event his judgment was proved sound, and although the Soviets shelled, bombed, and carried out sabotage in the border areas of Pakistan there was never any ground incursion.

At the outset Akhtar was virtually alone in thinking he could drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Before I joined IS! and the Jehad I too was skeptical of the ability of an army of ragtag guerrillas to defeat a modern conventional force with all its amour and aircraft. Certainly the US were far from enthusiastic at the beginning. They adopted a wait and see attitude. President Carter was locked into the intractable Tehran hostage crisis, which soured American opinion against all things Islamic, while advice from the Pentagon and CIA was that, with or without Pakistan’s backing, Afghanistan was a lost cause. They believed the Soviet Army would be in full control in Afghanistan in a matter of weeks. It was a country within the Soviet’s sphere of influence, so why throw good money after back and antagonise the Soviets by supporting the Mujahideen.