Up to the date of his tragic death on the 17th August, 1988, in the plane crash that also killed President Zia-ul-Haq, few people apart from his close family, knew General Akhtar as well as I. Certainly within Pakistan, his name was unknown to the public. Even within the military few appreciated his enormous contribution to the Afghan Jehad. This was partially due to the secretive nature of his job as Director-General of ISI from 1979-1987, and partially to his deliberate avoidance of publicity.

The ISI was, and still is probably the most powerful and influential organization in the country. It has responsibility for military and political intelligence gathering, together with overall coordination of internal security. Its activities must remain covert, its operatives clandestine, and its methods unorthodox. Like any national intelligence body it is regarded by many with apprehension, if not fear. During President Zia's military regime this was particularly so. Within the military the ISI and its senior staff were regarded with deep suspicion. Senior officers believed, with some justification, that ISI was watching them, that President Zia used ISI to keep a check on his generals. In these circumstances to be the Director-General, with daily direct access to the president was to be in a position of great power. Such power bred envy, distrust, and perhaps hatred, among some. This was the post held by General Akhtar for eight years - far longer than any other Director-General before or since. Had he not died with the president, the likelihood is that General Akhtar would have been requested to assume control in Pakistan, at least for a time.

The reason for General Akhtar's long tenure of office was his successful direction of the war in Afghanistan. Within the ISI is a specially formed bureau, headed by a brigadier (myself for the period 1983-87), charged with the day to day coordination of the Afghan Jehad. This department controls the allocation of arms and ammunition; their distribution to Mujahideen leaders and commanders; the training of Mujahideen in Pakistan; the allocation of funds from the US and Saudi Arabian governments; and the strategic planning of operations inside Afghanistan. It is the nearest that the Mujahideen came to having a general headquarters with overall logistic and operational responsibilities.

At least fifty percent of General Akhtar's time was spent on matters related to the war in Afghanistan. Under his leadership the Soviet superpower, although at the time I write this it has lost this status, was beaten on the battlefield. He achieved what most, including the Americans, initially considered impossible - the withdrawal of the foreign infidels from Afghanistan. His successes ensured his continuance in office. President Zia could not afford to lose him during those critical years, when the Mujahideen had to fight Armour and aircraft with rifles and mortars. When General Akhtar finally left ISI on promotion to four star general in March 1987, military victory in Afghanistan was in sight. The Mujahideen had at long last got an effective anti-aircraft weapon in the US Stinger missile, and the Soviets were talking in terms of withdrawal. If any one person could be singled out as the architect of this forthcoming victory it was General Akhtar.

Today the position is so very different. The victory that was anticipated by all in early 1989, when the last Soviet troops left Afghanistan, has not materialized, Najibullah and his gang remain in Kabul, the Soviets continue to pour in vast quantities of ammunitions and equipment, while the Mujahideen leadership fight political battles in Peshawar, rather than military ones around Kabul. Defeat appears to have been snatched from the jaws of victory.

I believe that there was a deliberate decision, taken by the US, that the Mujahideen should not be allowed an outright military victory, that they should not be permitted to march into Kabul. Once the Soviets were seen to be willing to withdraw the Americans resolved to keep the Islamic fundamentalists from taking over in Kabul. It suited both superpowers to have a stalemate on the battlefield. This covert switch of objectives was marked by the removal of General Akhtar, by promotion, from ISI. From then on the strength of the Jehad was on the wane; from then on it become more and more obvious to myself, and others, that our American allies had an objective that fell far short of a victory in the field.

I have great admiration for what General Akhtar achieved from the Jehad. Had he remained in ISI I feel certain that the Afghan war would have been won within months of the Soviet's retreat. Like so many soldiers before him he was sacrificed by politicians for political expediency, only in his case it was political pressure from outside Pakistan that removed him, just at the moment when the Mujahideen were poised to capture the fruits of victory.

Because I knew him so well, because I greatly admired his strength of character, and because I feel strongly that his contribution to the Jehad in Afghanistan should not be forgotten, I have written this short book. In it I attempt to highlight General Akhtar's role in the war, his character, and his professionalism as a soldier. Like us all he had his faults, there were times when he and I disagreed on strategy and tactics, but he will go down in history as the only general to take on the Soviet military machine since the end of World War 2 - and win. For this he should be saluted.

Having said all this, let me make it clear to the reader that while this book is primarily written to make public the contribution of General Akhtar to the Afghan Jehad, nothing could have been achieved without the endeavors of the Mujahideen, their commanders, and their political leaders. A guerrilla war is very much a war of junior leaders and individual soldiers. Afghanistan is no exception, the success of a rocket team. a machine gunner, or the firer of a Stringer anti-aircraft missile, can bring results out of all proportion to the size of the group. To the unfamiliar observer these tiny triumphs may appear insignificant, but multiply them a hundredfold, perhaps a thousand fold, and they become war winning events.

Year after year the Mujahideen have overcome immense difficulties and privations, the destruction of their homes, and total disruption or death of their families, in order to continue the fight against the infidel. It has been, and still is, a war of raids, ambushes assassinations, and rocket attacks, undertaken against a modern army well equipped with Armour and aircraft. These guerrilla tactics succeeded in wounding the Soviet Bear sufficiently to brig about a retreat from Afghanistan. Once again the Afghan Mujahideen have proven themselves to be unbeatable on the battlefield of their choice - in the dusty deserts and jagged mountains of their homeland.

General Akhtar was always the first to accept that this victory belonged to the Mujahideen and their families, who so often were called upon to make the supreme sacrifice in the struggle for the freedom of their country.