Is a quick US military victory possible in Afghanistan?

 When Soviets invaded Afghanistan in late December 1979, the Pentagon and CIA believed that Soviet Army would be in full control of Afghanistan in a matter of weeks. Carter administration started planning it’s future cold war strategy on the presumption of Afghanistan being firmly in Soviet control. But General Zia and Akhtar had a different assessment of the situation.  From the beginning, they had the courage to advocate taking on the world’s second most powerful superpower on the battlefield. They mostly relied on the Afghans warrior background, their historical tradition of prickly independence and their fortitude and stamina coupled with compelling moral force of jehad. The terrain also favored the guerilla war. The two Pakistani Generals jointly made the decision to support the Afghan Mujahideen covertly. It was a decision of far reaching effect. Albeit, they paid the price with their lives for this decision! The Soviets never succeeded in acquiring control on the entire length and breadth of Afghanistan. Eventually Soviet invasion of Afghanistan played a dominant role in its break up. It will not be a total surprise if the US met the same fate!

 The Afghan Jehad united the Muslim world for the first time in 20th century. Jehad in the western eyes had been a rallying force when it was mobilized against the Soviet Union but as it began to have spill over effect on Bosnia, Chechnya and elsewhere it became speedily demonised. The polarization quickened after 1991 Gulf War, which split the Muslim world into rival camps: those who appeased western foreign policy and those who defied them. Those who defied the US policies were promptly labeled as ‘Fundamentalists’.

 Pakistan’s power structure was radically changed soon after the mysterious crash in August 1988, which cost the lives of General Zia, Akhtar and the top echelon of the general officer’s class of the Pakistan Army. General Zia and Akhtar had planned and implemented Pakistan’s Afghan policy for years during the Soviet occupation. With their death, new powers and policies emerged to challenge the ISI’s authority and the Afghan policy.

 With the Soviet break up, the geo-political and strategic environments were spinning so fast that countries were unable to escape its devastating effects. A new World Order had emerged led by US with no worthwhile opposition in the world. Former enemies were embraced as long-lost friends, while tried and trusted friends were discarded overnight. With the Soviets out of the ‘big game’, the US turned its sensors elsewhere in the world: the Gulf, Somalia, China and the Central Asian States.

 Pakistan was amongst the first to experience the ingratitude of US. Washington abruptly cut the aid from $600 millions a year which Pakistan had been receiving during the Soviet –Afghan war to zero. The US also refused to deliver F 16 military aircrafts for which money was already paid. It made concerted efforts to prevent Pakistan to emerge as a ‘nuclear state’ and threatened to blacklist it as an ‘exporter of terrorism’. Not only that, US launched it’s open courtship with India, Pakistan’s historic nemesis, which had been an ally of the Soviets during the cold war.  

 The abrupt end of US assistance to Afghanistan in 1992, on the pretext that it was a drug producing country, had further aggravated the prevailing economic situation to crumble. Afghanistan, at that crucial stage badly needed the help of the world in general and US in particular for it’s rehabilitation and stability.

 Soon after the end of Soviet withdrawal agreed under the Geneva Accord of April 1988, the State Department reoriented it’s Afghan policy to thwart the Islamic fundamentalists getting firmly seated in Kabul. As a result, US enhanced its aid directly to Masood and later to the Northern Alliance. India, also grabbed the opportunity to strengthen Masood’s air power. Soon, Russians and Central Asian states decided to support Northern Alliance to destabilize the Taliban government in pursuit of their vested interests.

 The concept of broad base government and Zahir Shah factor are not new. It was introduced in 1985 for the first time by the UN envoy for Afghanistan on the behest of US and was actively supported by Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, the foreign minister. But General Akhtar and Afghan fundamentalist leaders out rightly opposed the proposal. Nevertheless, Zahir Shah continued to remain under consideration by the US and Pakistani foreign office for months.

  Benazir Bhutto attempted to rearrange the ex-king’s restoration in her first tenure of 1988-90. This time it was to be thwarted by General Hamid Gul, head of the ISI and Aslam Beg, chief of the army. The military nexus, in particular, was bent on preventing Zahir’s return, but now the situation has been reversed. It is the military that is supporting the return of Zahir Shah on the behest of US rather than the majority of Afghans. Today, Afghanistan certainly needs someone who is much younger, stronger with a reputation of having played a major role in the freedom struggle against the Soviets.

 Soon after the death of General Zia, there had been frequent changes in the governments of Pakistan. And so was the case with heads of the ISI. Amongst the ISI chiefs, General Hameed Gul, was the only staunch and genuine supporter of Afghan Jehad and is still supporting the Afghans after his retirement in his humble capacity. Afghan policy after the Soviet withdrawal was run at random and on ad-hoc basis with frequent interferences in their internal matters.  Pakistan lost its neutrality stance with Afghan leaders; which was once the scarlet thread of Pak- Afghan relations.

 Some military experts today, strongly feel that the present US war against Afghanistan will be over in matter of weeks with a decisive US victory. This assessment defies history. But have we ever learned from history?