WHAT NEXT

 When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in late December 1979, the Pentagon and CIA believed that the Soviet Army would be in full control in Afghanistan in a matter of weeks. They adopted a wait and see attitude. However, General Zia and Akhtar had recognized the potential of the situation, and from the beginning they had the courage to advocate taking on the world’s second most powerful superpower on the battlefield. They mostly relied on their warrior background, their historical tradition of prickly independence, their fortitude and stamina, coupled with the compelling moral force of jehad. The terrain also favoured the guerilla war. They jointly made the decision to support the Afghan Mujahideen covertly. It was a decision of far reaching effect, which eventually played a predominant role in the break up of the Soviet Union. Albeit, they had to pay the price of their lives for this decision.

 The Afghan Jehad united the Muslim world for the first time in the twentieth century. Jehad in the western eyes had been a rallying force when it was mobilized against the Soviet Union but as it began to have its spill over effect on Bosnia, Chechnya and elsewhere it became speedily demonised. The polarization quickened after the 1991 Gulf War, which split the Muslim world into the rival camps: which appeased western foreign policy and those which defied them. Those who defied the US policies were promptly labeled as ‘Fundamentalists’.

 Pakistan’s power structure was radically changed soon after a mysterious crash in August 1988, which cost the lives of General Zia, Akhtar along with cream of the officer’s class of the Pakistan Army. General Zia and Akhtar had planned and implemented Pakistan’s Afghan Policy for years during the Soviet occupation. With their death, new power and policies had emerged to challenge the ISI’s authority and the Afghan policy.

 With the Soviet break up, the geo-political and strategic environments were spinning so fast that countries were unable to escape its devastating effects. A new World Order had emerged led by the US with no worthwhile opposition in the world. Former enemies were embraced as long-lost friends, while tried and trusted friends were discarded overnight. With the Soviets out of the ‘big game’, the US turned its sensors elsewhere in the world: the Gulf, Somalia, China and the Central Asian States.

 Pakistan was amongst the first to experience the ingratitude of the US. Washington abruptly cut the aid from $600 millions a year which Pakistan had been receiving during the Soviet –Afghan war to zero. The US also refused to deliver F 16 military aircrafts for which money was already paid. She made concerted efforts to prevent Pakistan to emerge as a ‘nuclear state’ and threatened to blacklist it as ‘exporter of terrorism’. Not only that, US launched her open courtship with India, Pakistan’s historic nemesis, which had been an ally of the Soviets for a long time.  

 The abrupt end of US assistance to Afghanistan in 1992, on the pretext that it was a drug producing country, had further aggravated the prevailing economic situation to crumble. Afghanistan, at that crucial stage badly needed the help of the world in general and the US in particular for her rehabilitation programmed and stability.

 Soon after the end of the Soviet withdrawal, agreed under the Geneva Accord of April 1988, the State Department reoriented her Afghan policy to thwart the Islamic fundamentalists getting firmly seated at Kabul. As a result US enhanced her aid directly to Masood and later to the Northern Alliance. India, also grabbed the opportunity to strengthen Masood’s air power. Soon Russia and Central Asian states decided to support the Northern Alliance to destabilize the Taliban’s government in pursuit of their vested interests.

 The concept of broad base government and Zahir Shah’s factor are not new. It was introduced in 1985 for the first time by the UN envoy for Afghanistan on the behest of US and was actively supported by Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, the foreign minister. But the proposal was out rightly opposed not only by General Akhtar but also by Afghan fundamentalist leaders. Nevertheless, Zahir Shah continued to remain under consideration by the US and Pakistani foreign office for months.

  Benazir Bhutto attempted to rearrange the ex-king’s restoration in her first tenure of 1988-90. This time it was to be thwarted by General Hamid Gul, head of the ISI and Aslam Beg, chief of the army. The military nexus, in particular, was bent on preventing Zahir’s return, but now the situation has been reversed. It is the military that is supporting the return of Zahir Shah on the behest of US rather than the majority of Afghans. Today, Afghanistan certainly needs someone who is much younger, stronger with a reputation of having played a major role in the freedom struggle against the Soviets.

 After the death of General Zia, there had been frequent changes in the governments of Pakistan. And so was the case with heads of the ISI who were changed at random. Certainly some were changed to appease the US administration. Amongst the ISI chiefs, General Hameed Gul, was the only staunch and genuine supporter of Afghan Jehad and is still supporting the Afghan cause after his retirement in his humble capacity. Afghan policy after the Soviet withdrawal was run at random and on ad-hoc basis with frequent interferences in their internal matters. Since long, Pakistan had lost its neutrality stance with Afghan leaders; which was once the scarlet thread of Pak- Afghan relations.

 The US-Afghan War has entered into 4^th week. The air strikes combined with missile attacks seems to have failed to achieve any appreciable results which Pentagon might have planned to achieve in their initial plans. On the contrary, the strikes were mostly conducted against cities where majority population despise Taliban’s regime. This has adversely affected the existing American support.  The high hopes for a “quick short war” have diminished.

 The American reliance on Northern Alliance has already been proved to almost zero. The Northern Alliance certainly does not consist of ‘trained army’ and thus incapable of fighting a conventional war: set piece attack. They can at best be used effectively in guerilla type of operations for protecting the line of communications and other vital targets or in a typical tribal war. To fight a conventional war effectively, they need vigorous training at various echelons of their command structure along with the induction of necessary weapon system. This would be time consuming. The loss of Ahmed Shah Masood is irreparable. The recent killing of Abdul Haq is yet another blow to the US interests.

 There is no worthwhile communication infrastructure in Afghanistan. The difficult terrain further impedes the large-scale movement and thus generation of combat power vital for any conventional war. Long Line of Communication from US to Afghanistan is yet another major hurdles for the induction of ground forces in Afghanistan. Her reluctance to induct her conventional forces is genuine. The US seems to be in a dilemma. The military judgment is certainly against the induction of ground forces while the US National pride seems to be at stake. The US will have to find a middle course.

 The military experts, who thought that the present war against Afghanistan will be over in matter of days like that of Iraq war, failed to learn from the history of Vietnam and Afghan Wars. ‘Besides, a common religion, Islam, only foreign invaders- from Alexander the Great to the British in the 19^th century, and the Soviets in the 20^th- have united the Afghans’. Will the American War help the Talibans too?

 History generally repeats, but we seldom learn from history.