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‘Alexander next marched
to the Oxus [Amu] opposite Kilif, where the river was about
three-quarters of a mile wide. It was crossed by means of skins
stuffed with chaff.... it took in all five days.’
Major-General J.F.C.
Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander the Great, 1958.
SOME 2,300 years after
Alexander had crossed the Amu a high-ranking American official
was examining this river on my map. His interest was focused on
that part of it that formed the border between the Soviet Union
and Afghanistan, particularly where it meandered for some 500
kilometres across the plain from Badakshan in the east to just
beyond Kilif in the west. Then, using Winston Churchill’s famous
phrase, coined during World War 2 about Italy, he declared,
‘This is the soft underbelly of the Soviet Union’. William Casey
was thus the first person seriously to advocate operations
against the Soviets inside their own territory. In his view the
ethnic, tribal and religious ties of the people who lived on
both sides of this river should be exploited. He was convinced
that stirring up trouble in this region would be certain to give
the Russian bear a bellyache. He suggested to General Akhtar
that perhaps a start could be made by smuggling written
propaganda material across, to be followed by arms to encourage
local uprisings. Akhtar agreed to consider the written
materials, but deliberately did not respond on the explosive
issue of weapons.
Thus it was the US that put
in train a major escalation of the wat which, over the next
three years, culminated in numerous cross-border raids and
sabotage missions north of the Amu. During this period we were
specifically to train and dispatch hundreds of Mujahideen up to
25 kilometres deep inside the Soviet Union. They were probably
the most secret and sensitive operations of the war. They only
occurred during my rime with ISI as, in 1987, an audacious, and
successful attack on an industrial site well north of the river
caused the water temperature to come perilously close to
boiling, which compelled Prime Minister Junejo lo halt them.
There was, for a short while, real fear among the politicians
that the Soviet Union and Pakistan might go to war. It was a
dangerous game. Casey had been correct — we were touching an
extremely tender spot.
As I write this the world
has witnessed the communist empire crumbling round its edges,
including its southern edges. The Kremlin has always been
concerned to keep the lid on its ethnic minorities, particularly
those who were faithful to Is The Afghan border touches three
Soviet Republics — Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan; it
divides two countries but it does not divide the people (see Map
19). The Turkomans, Uzbeks and Tajiks of Afghanistan share the
same culture, history, languages, appearance and religion with
their neighbors a few hundred metres away over the frontier.
Moscow’s specific worry was the spread of fundamentalism and its
influence on Soviet Central Asian Muslims. This was one of the
reasons for the invasion in the first place, to prevent the
possibility of a Khomeini-style régime sweeping aside the
fledgling communist government in Kabul. It had removed a threat
to the Soviet Union’s southern border. This fear of
fundamentalism was one that they shared with the US, and which,
I believe, was ultimately to prevent an outright military
victory for the Mujahideen in 1989.
When Casey studied the map,
what did he see? He was looking at a region that had political
and economic, as well as military, importance. The Kremlin had
no wish to see political instability in the area, no wish to see
a religious revival which could not only disrupt the war effort,
but might merge with a nationalistic movement aimed at greater
autonomy, or even independence. The Soviet military presence in
these republics, and in Afghanistan, was also protecting an
investment. These southern regions were a rich source of natural
gas, oil and minerals for Moscow. Considerable effort had been
made to develop these natural resources, to build up an
industrial infrastructure, and expand road, rail and air
communications.
Over the past three decades
the Soviets had used the mask of international aid to explore,
identify and map the natural resources of Afghanistan. Their
invasion was substantially motivated by the need to seize them.
Indeed within a few months they had stolen millions of dollars
worth of precious stones, including 2.2 kilos of uncut emeralds,
from government stores. Eighty per cent of all natural gas
flowed from the fields around Shibarghan, north over the Amu.
Even the metering of the amount was carried out in the Soviet
Union, and Soviet officials decided the price they would pay, or
rather be credited against Afghanistan’s ‘debt’ to Moscow. As
far as I am aware this milking of the Afghan economy continues
today.
Southern Central Asia had
only belonged to the Soviets for about a hundred years. It was a
part of their empire acquired by force, and it still required
force to retain it. Modern Termez, the centre of their base of
supply for the war, had begun its life as a Russian fort in
1897, but for over 2,O years before that few Russians had ever
ventured that far south. This area, which boasted one of the
hottest temperatures recorded in the Soviet Union, 50 degrees
centigrade, had seen Alexander’s army when it re crossed the Amu
nearby on its return from Samarkand on the march to India. The
ancient town of Termez flourished in the first century BC,
welcomed Islam from the Arabs, was sacked by Ghengis Khan’s
Golden Horde, became a part of Tamer lane's empire, and was again
destroyed at the end of the 17th century.

Into this melting pot of
peoples, languages, cultures and Islam the Soviets had recently
poured communism and quickly slammed the lid. The Army made sure
it stayed shut. Casey had been right. It was an area of great
potential for seriously damaging our enemy.
One of the men involved in
our campaign of incursions over the Amu from the outset, indeed
he later became the Commander of the raid that resulted in our
being ordered to halt these operations, was Wall Beg. This is
not his real name, as for obvious reasons it is essential for me
to conceal his true identity. Wali Beg is an Uzbek, 53 years old
but looks older, with a beard nearer to white than gray. He used
to be a farmer and had a wife, two Sons and a daughter. Now he
has lost all his close family, and lives the life of a crippled
carpet maker in a refugee camp in Pakistan. His original home
was one of the tiny, long-since-destroyed villages on the south
bank of the river in Kunduz Province. His house was only minutes
walk from the water. It was also not far from the old Afghan
river port of Sherkhan, which the Soviets had recently developed
into a fuel storage area. A bridge now straddles the river at
Sherkhan. This is a new structure, as trade and people had
crossed the Amu for centuries in boats and barges at ferry
crossing places. Waji remembers going over as a boy with his
father to meet relatives and friends on the far side. Sometimes
these people would visit his family. They would cross on
flat-bottomed boats, towed by two swimming horses attached to
outriggers. The horses were guided by the ferryman, and were
partially supported in the water by the outriggers. By such
means large loads of men and goods could be moved slowly across.
Wali’s background is
typical of millions of Afghans. Islam had dominated his village
life, with the mosque as the centre of all social organization.
Only boys received any education, and that was in the mosque
school, where Wall had learned to read a little, and learned a
lot of verses and prayers from the Holy Koran. At the age of ten
he became a herdsman and fed the animals. In rural Afghanistan
every family, except the very poorest, has a few animals: a
donkey, or preferably a horse, for transport, a cow for milking
and calves, an ox to make up a yoke with neighbour, and a few
goats or sheep. At fifteen he learned to plough.
Wall told me that his wife
had been selected for him when she was still an infant. When she
was fourteen they were married without his ever having seen her
face, although relatives had told him she was pretty. Marriage
was for the production of children. Most young women in those
days expected to have a child every two years, although many
died in infancy. Instances of one woman having sixteen children,
of whom only five or six reached adulthood, are not unknown.
Allah blessed Wall with fourchildren, of whom two Sons and a
daughter lived.
Wali grew up beside the
Amu, so over the years he acquired an extensive knowledge of his
area. i knew the river, the tracks leading to it the reed swamps
that clogged its banks, and its twists and turns and tributary
streams. He knew the strength of the current, he knew the river
in flb and in the winter when the water was at its lowest. 1-
knew the little sandy islands that sometimes split the sluggish
flow.
With the Soviet invasion
Wali’s life was devastated. His sons had joined the Mujahideen,
but the youngest, a boy of seventeen, was soon Shaheed in
fighting along the Kunduz-Baghlan road. The eldest simply
disappeared. To Wali this indicated arrest, infinitely worse
than an honourable death in the Jehad. When I talked with Wali he was convinced his boy was dead, but it was the probable
manner of his dying that consumed him. The tortures his son
would have had to bear before death had released him made Wall’s
hatred of the Soviets totally merciless. The bombing of his
village while he was in Kunduz had killed his daughter, so he
and his wife had fled to Pakistan via Chitral Within a few
months she had succumbed to malaria. For our purpose Waifs
knowledge of the border region, coupled with his oath of
vengeance taken against the Soviets, made him an ideal Mujahid
to carry the war over the Amu.
I had several options in
attacking the Soviets in their own country. I could start with
tentative incursions to distribute propaganda and to sound out
how receptive the people would be to assisting with sabotage or
other missions. Then I could confine our activities to firing
into Soviet territory from inside Afghanistan, or sink barges
and steamers on the river. Finally, I could send reams over the
river to carry out rocket attacks, mine-laying, derailment of
trains or ambushes. It was decided to start with the renewal of
contacts, together with the distribution propaganda to test the
water before anything more adventurous.
Casey had suggested sending
books, and I had discussions on this with a CIA psychological
warfare expert who recommended several books describing Soviet
atrocities against Uzheks. He was himself an Uzbek who had been
working with the CIA since 1948. Although we agreed to use these
books, our inclination was to send in copies of the Holy Koran
that had been translated into Soviet Uzbek. We persuaded the CIA
to obtain 10,000 copies.
While these were being
printed we called in a number of Commanders and other suitable
persons, including Wali, from the northern provinces. They were
carefully screened, briefed to make contacts over the Amu and
report back on whether the Holy Koran would be welcome, and
whether some of the people would be willing to assist any future
operations by giving information on Soviet troops movements,
industrial installations, or act as guides. Later Wall explained
to me how he bad made his first trip in the late spring of 1984.
He decided to make for a
village that he had last visited about ten years previously, as
there was a good chance one or two of the families he knew would
still be there. It was not safe to cross near Sherkhan, with
its busy Soviet port of Nizhniy l’yandzh on the opposite bank,
so he chose a quieter area where the river made several loops,
and there were large expanses of jungle and reeds before
reaching the bank. It would need to be a night crossing as he
knew there were border security posts, and possibly patrols by
day. Because of the distance he could not manhandle a boat, so
it would mean swimming at least 600 meters, possibly more, as
the Amu was full of icy water from melting snows. Wall had
killed a goat, dried its skin and inflated it. He intended to
cross as Alexander’s soldiers had done.
He had set off after dark
carrying his goatskin. Within two hours he hit the reeds and
swamp on the south bank, which slowed progress and were noisy.
When he finally reached the river he could dimly see the land
opposite only about 300 metres away. He was in luck — only a
short swim. In fact he only had to swim for about half the
distance, with the goatskin easily taking the weight of his
body. The ground on the far side was flat and sandy, but after
walking for some time he came to the river again. For a moment
Wali had been perplexed, surely he had not walked in a circle.
The channel in front of him was barely 100 metres across. Then
it struck him; he had been on an island. Although he did not
know it, the boundary between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union
ran through the island, so he was now in hostile territory.
Another short swim, followed by a two-hour walk brought him to
the houses of the village he sought; The first grey streaks of
dawn were on the horizon when Wali quietly dropped on his knees,
bent forward to touch the sand with his forehead, offering his
thanks to Allah for his mercy so far.
Wali spent two days in the
village, much of the time out in the fields as a shepherd with
his friends and their sheep. His report was entirely favourable.
His contacts would welcome copies of the Holy Koran, and, yes,
they would pass them on. Two men had asked for rifles, but Wali
had not been able to agree to this at this stage. Perhaps later,
if things developed well, weapons would follow; for the moment
information on which to plan, and a willingness to provide
guides or shelter was all that was needed.
Wall’s two days in the
field were most revealing. There was a busy 25 road running NE
between Nizhniy Pyandzh and the town of Dusti. Close to Dusti
was an airfield. An overhead electric pylon me followed the
road, upon which there was considerable traffic, including many
military vehicles. Dusti had a Soviet garrison, and Waifs
friends were certain military planes used the airfield. They
told him of a railway line that linked Dusti with the riverside
town of Pyandzh some 40 kilometres upriver from where Wali had
crossed. This railway had a road paralleling it all the way, and
was protected by border posts at regular intervals as it came
dose to the river for much of its length.
Wali was one of the dozens
of Mujahideen who ventured across the river over a period of
several months in 1984. Most of them brought back similarly
encouraging news. We duly received the Holy Korans and the other
books and began to take them over in batches of 100-300 at a
time in small rubber boats, or Zodiacs (eight-man wooden recce
boats) with small outboard engines. The latter were not popular
as they were too noisy. The CIA had provided the boats but could
riot oblige with the specially silenced outboards that we had
requested. About 5,000 Holy Korans were thsiributed, but the
atrocity novels did not have much appeal. I was impressed by the
number of reports of people wanting to assist. Some wanted
weapons, some wanted to join the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, and
others to participate in operations inside the Soviet Union.
We were now in a position
to start raising the water temperature.
By 1985 it became obvious
that the US had got cold feet. I had asked for more Holy Korans
and large-scale maps of the Soviet Union up to 30 kilometres
north of the border, on which to plan our incursions, but, while
the Holy Korans were no problem, I was told no maps could be
provided. It was not that their satellites were not taking the
pictures, they were, but somebody at the top in the American
administration was getting frightened. From then on we got no
information on what was happening north of the Amu from the CIA.
They produced detailed maps of anywhere we asked in Afghanistan,
but when the sheet covered a part of the Soviet Union, that part
was always blank (see Map 20). The CIA, and others, gave us
every encouragement unofficially to take the war into the Soviet
Union, hut they were careful not to provide anything that might
be traceable to the US. They quoted some article, which t do not
remember, for their sudden inability to help in this respect.
The Afghanistan border with
the Soviet Union is over 2,000 kilometres long. For more than
half this distance it is the Amu River, hut in the west the
frontier is merely an erratic line across the desert and barren
rocks of southern Turkmenistan to Iran. From my point of view,
in selecting suitable Soviet targets, the border divided itself
neatly into three. In the east, from Takhar Province to the
eastern tip of the Wakhan peninsula where Afghanistan and China
briefly touch each other, the border snakes its way through deep
mountain gorges. The Wakhan was part of the roof of the world
with towering, lofty, icy peaks over 20,000 feet high.
Population was sparse, all the valleys cut
off for months on end in the winter, and even in the less
inhospitable Badakshan further west there were few worthwhile targets
near the border.

Similarly, the western half
of the frontier crossed arid land. Only around Kushka (see Map 9), which
was the base of supply for the Soviet forces in the extreme west of
Afghanistan, were there installations worth attacking.
It was the central 500 kilometres, from Kilif in the west to north of Faizabad in the east, that
was the underbelly’ that Casey had described. Throughout 1984 1 had
expended much rime and effort in boosting the Mujahideen activities in
the northern provinces. I had persuaded General Akhtar of their
importance and managed to increase the allocation of heavier
weapons to the more effective Commanders in this area. The
problems were largely ones of distance and time. Winter closed
our math supply route from Chitral, so much forward planning was
necessary to get large convoys to the Mujahideen operational
bases facing the Amu. A minor operation would take up to six
months to plan and execute, while a major one would need nine.
For this reason it was not until 19S6 that our campaign started
to be effective.
As the optimistic reports
came in of contacts anxious to help I had many discussions with
my staff as to how we should start bear-baiting in earnest. We
decided on a cautious and gradual campaign of incursions, but
spread our over a wide area. Depending on our success rate, we
could increase the frequency and depth of the penetrations,
although I had to assess the Soviet reaction with great care, as
I had no wish to provoke a direct confrontation.
First, there was the river
itself, There had always been a brisk trade both along and
across the river. Now, with the Amu acting as the forward edge
of the Soviet supply base, the traffic across had increased
fivefold. All the Soviet freight in trucks and trains headed for
the river. The choke points were the crossing places, mainly the
bridges at Sherkhan and 1-tairaran (Termez). This latter was a
newly built, 1000-metre long iron bridge over the Amu, about 12
kilometres west of Termez. Opened in June, 1982, it had been
named the ‘Friendship Bridge’, and was the first road and rail
link ‘between the two countries. Built at a cost of 34 million
rubles, this bridge was expected greatly to speed up the
movement of goods and had greatly strengthened the Soviets’
strategic position. It had enabled the Soviets to establish, for
the first time, a railhead on the south side of the Amu.
Hairatan was expanded as a port to handle the bulk of the river
trade. The bridge marked the start of the Salang Highway on its
long journey to Kabul. In addition to the road and rail it also
carried the oil pipeline, and as such was second only to the
Salang Tunnel as a critical congestion point on the Soviets’
main line of communication.
I started the long process
of planning, with the aim of blowing this bridge, in early 1985. 1 asked the
CIA to provide technical advice. They cooperated to the extent of
recommending the type and amount of charges needed, where they
should be placed, also details of the current, flow and best
time of year to destroy it. The expert favoured a summer attack,
with a minimum of two spans, preferably three, collapsing. The
actual operation would need to be an underwater demolition
mission by night. The CIA did not, however, give us good
photographs of the bridge; for these we had to rely on the
amateur efforts of local Commanders. It was they who also
reported on the security arrangements. These consisted of
sentries and a company post on the Afghan side, plus an APC on
permanent duty. We could identify the guard posts at the Soviet
end. I went ahead with ordering all the equipment from the CIA.
I called for a Commander to bring a team for special underwater
demolition training at a suitable dam inside Afghanistan, but,
in late 1985, the operation was called off. General Akhtar had
explained what was to happen to the President who had vetoed it
immediately. He was worried that its success might trigger a
series of sabotage attacks on key bridges inside Pakistan.
Personally, I did not consider this likely, but I could not
argue. Once again I was thwarted in my efforts to hit the two
main Salang Highway bottlenecks — the tunnel and the bridge.
Barges and boats were
easier, although the high level of activity and security near
crossing places meant that these attacks needed to be covert,
and therefore during darkness. We required limpet mines that a
small recce boar or a swimmer could carry, which could be
clamped to the side of the boat just below the water line. For
these we turned to the British, via MI-6. They obliged, and it
was the UK small, but effective, contribution to destroying a
number of loaded barges on the Soviet side of the Amu throughout
1986. Others were sunk by recoilless rifle fire from positions in
the reeds and swamps near the south bank.
Because the Americans
declined to provide maps or photographs of Soviet territory I
was hampered in selecting targets both for rocket attacks from
inside Afghanistan and for the Mujahideen raiding parties
crossing the river. I had to rely on information brought back
from operations, such as Wali Beg had provided after his first
mission. During 1986 some fifteen Commanders were specially
trained in Pakistan for these operations. In particular we
concentrated on derailment. A massive amount of freight came
down the rail link from Samarkand to Termez, but there was also
a Link line that hugged the northern bank of the Amu, which was
within striking distance. We did succeed with several such
attacks, but two large-scale operations failed when the Soviets
reacted quickly to cut off the invaders. I am certain they had
been forewarned.
Commanders were issued with
107mm Chinese single-barreled rocket launchers SBRLs) and 122mm
Egyptian rocket launchers, with ranges of nine and eleven
kilometres respectively, which meant they could set up their
firing positions well south of the river, and still bring down
effective fire inside the Soviet Union. Teams went across to hit
border posts, lay anti-tank and anti-personnel mines on the
tracks between posts, and to knock down power lines. Despite the
C advice to the contrary, as they were worried they might fall
into Soviet hands, we positioned several Stingers in the north,
close to the Amu. On one occasion, in December, 1986, some
thirty Mujahideen crossed in rubber boats near the base of the
Walthan panhandle to attack two hydro-electric power stations in
Tajikistan. This raid involved an assault on two small Soviet
guard posts, during which some eighteen Muslim soldiers
surrendered and joined the Jehad, It was later reported that a
number were subsequently Shaheed in Afghanistan.
There were many operations
launched from the Hazrar Imam district in Kunduz Province, the
area from which Wali Beg came. An attractive target that came
under rocket attack was the small Soviet town of Pyandzh, set
among the cotton fields within a hundred metres of the north
bank of the Amu. The attraction was the airfield on the northern
edge of the town, which was in frequent use by military planes
and helicopters launching retaliatory strikes at villages around
Kunduz.
Just to the west of where
Wail first crossed the Amu on his goatskin is Sherkhan river
port, with its Soviet twin of Nizhniy Pyandzh on the far side
(see Map 2 I). The main road from Kunduz comes north until it
almost hits the river at Sherkhan village before swinging west
for the 5-kilometre run to the port facilities. It used to be a
busy ferry crossing point, but the Soviets built a pontoon
bridge to take a road that has two branches leaving Nizhniy
Pyandzh. One goes NE to Dusti, while the other goes NW, before
turning back to become the river road that follows the north
bank of the Amu all the way to Termez and beyond. The importance
of this facility to the Soviets was that the road fed the 201st
MED at Kunduz, and then joined the Salang Highway at their main
fuel and vehicle depot Pul-i-Khumri.
I was keen that the
Sherkhan/Nizhniy Pyandzh fuel storage complex came under attack.
The fuel was stored in ranks and open storage areas on both
sides of the river, and there was barrack accommodation for the
Soviet border security unit near the northern end of the pontoon
bridge. The layout of the area on Map 20 shows it exactly as I
was given it by the CIA, with all the territory north of the
river blank. I had to pinpoint potential targets and other
features from Mujahideen sources, and then try to locate them on
the map. The concentric circles were drawn to assist the
Commander in estimating the range to his chosen target. Using
this map, and the Commanders’ local knowledge, it was not
difficult to se a series of alternative firing positions for his
rocket launchers. The river, streams, tracks, houses, swamp and
road were known to him, and he could point out likely positions
and approaches to them on my map. We could then give him the
various bearings and ranges from each position to each target.
This was important, as few Mujahideen could read a map, but
provided we supplied the technical data for firing, they were
able to get good results.
In this instance we
highlighted the facilities in Nizhniy Pyandzh (the blank area
just north of the bridge), emphasizing that so long as the
rocket launcher was located within the 7-kilometre circle he
would be certain to be in range of the targets in the Soviet
Union. The Commander was given complete discretion as to which
target he engaged, from which firing position, and when he
carried out his attacks. For example, we might ask that he did
so once a week for two months, but nothing more specific. Within
six weeks of our briefing the Commander at Peshawar, rockets
started to rain down on Nizhniy Pyandzh.
These cross-border strikes
were at their peak during 1986. Scores of attacks were made
across the Amu from Jozjan to Badakshan Provinces. Sometimes
Soviet citizens joined in these operations, or came back into
Afghanistan to join the Mujahideen. As I have mentioned above,
in at least one instance some Soviet soldiers deserted to us.
That we were hitting a sore spot was confirmed by the ferocity
of the Soviets’ reaction. Virtually every incursion provoked
massive aerial bombing and gunship attacks on all villages south
of the river in the vicinity of our strike. These were punitive
missions, with no other purpose than razing houses, killing
people and forcing the survivors to flee, thus creating a belt
of ‘scorched earth’ along the Amu, from which it would hopefully
prove impossible for the Mujahideen to operate. Their aim was
sufficiently to demoralize the population to halt our
incursions.
In so far as destroying
villages, killing women and children and driving survivors into
Pakistani refugee camps were concerned, the Soviets succeeded.
But if stopping our attacks or weakening the Mujahideen resolve
were their objectives, they failed. We continued to bait the
bear until April, 1987, when Soviet diplomatic reaction rather
than military, sufficiently frightened Pakistani politicians
into ordering us to stop. Perhaps our April attacks were just
that much over-ambitious and represented too deep a cut in the
Soviet anatomy
During late 1986 we made
tentative plans to continue operations inside the Soviet Union
the following spring. With this in mind Commanders were trained,
briefed and supplied with the necessary weapons and ammunition
before winter set in. In April we hoped to start the offensive
with three slightly more ambitious attacks. The first involved a
heavy rocket attack on an airfield called Shurob East, some 25
kilometres NW of Termez, near the Soviet village of Gilyambor.
It was not a major airfield, but it was in use, and lay only 3
kilometres north of the river, so the firing positions could be
in Afghanistan. In early April this bombardment was successfully
completed, with the airstrip being engaged several times over a
period of ten days.
The second attack involved
a party of twenty men armed with RPGs and anti-tank mines, tasked
with ambushing the frontier road east of Termez, between that town and the
Tajikistan border. They were to lay the mines between two security posts,
wait for some vehicles to hit the mines, then open fire and
withdraw. In the event three soft-skinned Soviet vehicles drove
along the road at night, one hit a mine and the two others were
destroyed by RPG rounds. Several Soviet soldiers were reported
killed or injured, the nearby post opened up with mortar and
machine-gun fire, and the Mujahideen pulled back over the Amu.
This was followed by the third, and most ambitious, mission
which penetrated some 20 kilometres north of the Amu, and struck
an industrial target close to the airfield at Voroshilovabad
(see Map 21). This was Wali Begs operation.

By 1986 Wall was a
commander in his own right, with operational control over about
300 men. He had been inside the Soviet Union five times since
his first reconnaissance mission in 1984. The area I had chosen
for him was the large region between the Amu, north of Sherkhan,
and the Soviet town of Kurgan Tyube. It was a well developed
area with no less than nine airfields, industrial facilities,
railway depots, and power stations (see Map 21). It was full of
potential targets and I was hoping that Wali would be able to
get much deeper inside than we had managed previously. Not that
I was able to be specific as to what to expect, or exactly where
he would find a worthwhile objective. The only guidelines I
could give him were to go in on a long reconnaissance, make
contact with his friends, then find a suitable target, firing
positions and routes in and out. The detailed planning I left to
Wali, who I had come to respect as a shrewd tactician.
He took two Mujahideen with
him in early April. All three crossed the Amu in a small recce
boat, not far from his first crossing place nearly three years
earlier. After a night at his friend’s house they were taken up
into the hills behind the village to graze sheep. Leaving one
man to tend the animals, Wall and his comrade set off north with
the guide. He had a compass and binoculars, and wanted to reach
a good position from which to observe the plain below him to the
west. It was a clear spring morning. They would see the road
from Pyandzh to Kurgan Tyube about 5 kilometres from the hills
on which they stood. Even at this early hour there was some
military traffic. They walked fast for several hours, keeping to
the goat and sheep trails, until they had covered some 12
kilometres, and were overlooking the centre of the plain east of
Kolkhozabad. They had only met a few shepherds, to whom their
guide shouted a greeting as they passed.
Wali and his companions had
no map, neither did they know the names of the Soviet industrial
areas, factories or airfields that were scattered over the
cotton-growing plain below them. Wali needed to find a target,
one that he would be able to get within 9 kilometres of by
night, and then withdraw from hurriedly while it was still dark.
He slowly scanned the area through his binoculars. He could see
vehicles on the road about 7 kilometers from his position, and
near that what had to be a small airstrip upon which a light
aircraft had just landed. Beyond, but close to the airfield,
were a cluster of high chimneys belching black smoke. In front
of the airfield, by the road, and on the far side of it,
were several long, grayish buildings with a number of shorter chimneys,
with more smoke — a factory of some sort. Wali took a bearing. From
the spur on which he stood, the factory, airfield and high chimneys
were more or less lined up on 283 degrees. The range to the factory? Hard
to be sure, but not more than 9 and not less than 7 kilometres. However,
it was spread over a largish area, with what seemed to be a lot of
industrial-type buildings in the vicinity of the factory. If he missed the
factory there was still a good chance of hitting something worthwhile. It
would suffice. The firing position was easy, it could be anywhere on the
spur on which he stood. Wali and his companions hurried home,
rechecking the route as they went, noting the landmarks and timing
themselves over the distance. They were back well before dusk — a round trip
of eight hours.
Like most military
commanders, WaIi's problems were largely centered on getting to and from the
target. The actual firing was the easy part. It was a question of time and
space. He would need to go lightly armed, with only personal weapons
and two Chinese-made 107mm SBRL. These were ideal. With a range of
9 kilometres, they could each be manpacked by two men, one carrying
the bipod, the other the barrel. Wali considered taking only one, but the
thought of it failing at the crucial moment convinced him to play it
safe. He wanted to fire up to thirty rockets, which, at one per man,
meant a total force of at least thirty-four men.
With four recce boats, he
would need one night to get his men and weapons across the Amu and
safely into a scrub-covered gully in the hills beyond his contact’s
village. They would shelter in the gully that day and set off immediately it got
dark at around 7.00 pm. That would give him II hours to do the job and
return, walking at night carrying the SBRL rockets and rifles. By day
it had taken eight, so it was cutting it a bit fine, but if they stopped an hour
before dawn to find a suitable hide it should be enough. He was certain
they would have to wait another day in the hills before re-crossing
the river on the third night.
The operation went ahead in
mid-April After pre-positioning the recce boats in the reeds near the
river bank the night before, Wali and his men crossed over and were met
by their guide. He safely led them between the Soviet border posts up into
their hide in the hills. A sweltering day was spent under blankets and
rocks in a small gully, trying to sleep, occasionally nibbling at
nan bread, or drinking a little water from chugals (water bottles).
I took five hours hard
marching to reach the firing position. The night sky was lit by myriad
stars, while the plain below sparkled with hundreds of electric lights. Both
SBRLs were set up with fifteen rockets apiece. Wali took his bearing, then
went to each launcher to check the setting. He adjusted the
elevation to give a range of 8 kiometres on one launcher and 7.5
on the other, to give himself a better chance of hitting the
factory with at least some of the rockets.
‘Allah o Akbar — Fire’.
With their distinctive whoosh and roar two rockets soared up in
their graceful arcs. All eyes followed the trails until they
both plunged out of sight into the blackness, the white flash of
the final explosions just visible for a split second. Wall had
included ten smoke rockets, for their incendiary properties,
with the HE, as he hoped to set some buildings on fire. Now both
launchers fired independently until all the rockets had gone,
while Wall peered through his binoculars at the impact area.
Something was burning over there, but Wali did not wait to watch
for more than a few minutes, just long enough to know the strike
was successful.
The journey back to the
hide was uneventful. As Wali had anticipated, they did not have
sufficient darkness left to cross the river, so spent a second
day crouched among the boulders and scrub. From there they saw
the start of the Soviet reaction. Within an hour of daybreak
gunships and fighter bombers swarmed south over the Amu to pound
the area around Imam Sahib and the high ground beyond. All day
the planes flew back and forth, blasting every village, every
valley that might conceal Mujahideen — not that the already
ruined buildings housed more than a handful of people. By 1987
they had long gone to Pakistan, Kunduz or Kabul. The planes kept
coming for a week. Wali’s cut into the ‘soft underbelly’ had
been deep and the bear’s roar of rage was loud and long.
It was the next night,
after re-crossing the river, when the party was making its way
round Imam Sahib that disaster struck. Unbeknown to the
Mujahideen, the Soviet helicopters had been dropping hundreds of
anti-personnel mines, mostly of the butterfly’ type. They took
their name from the little wings they had, which enabled them to
flutter gently down without tumbling. Coloured brown or green,
these vicious mines blended with the soil or rocks and could
easily remove the foot of the unwary. This is what happened to
Wali. A flash, a bang, and Wali collapsed with his left foot
hanging by a piece of tendon and skin. A quick tourniquet with a
piece of cord, a quick cut with a sharp knife to remove the foot
before the numbing effect of the injury wore off was the best
his companions could do; then a blanket tied to rifles as a
stretcher, followed by the long, agonizing trek into the hills.
They were hounded from the air for six days, during which four
more men were wounded. Wali would have preferred to the. He
would have been a Shaheed; he would have joined his family;
Allah the Merciful would surely have welcomed him. Now, he was a
cripple with nothing to live for. He could not even continue to
kill Soviets.
Somehow, even though the
will to live had gone, even though it was several weeks before
he could be brought on horseback to Pakistan for proper
attention, Wall survived. It was several weeks after I had left
the Army that I heard the full story of his raid into the Soviet
Union from Wali himself, as he sat learning to make carpets in a
camp not far from Peshawar. Had he been a regular soldier Wali
would have received a high decoration for his leadership that
day. As it was, he was content to know that his attack had been
too successful, too damaging and too daring.
By one of those strange
twists of fate 25 April, 1987, the date that brought the Soviet
Ambassador in Islamabad to our Foreign Minister’s office, was
the same day that the Army Promotion Board declined to promote
me to major-general.
Wail’s attack had caused
considerable damage and inflicted a number of Soviet casualties,
although I was never able to establish exactly how many. The
smoke rockets had started a fire which had consumed several
buildings, but it was the suddenness, the ferocity and the
distance (about 20 kilometres) inside the Soviet Union that was
so galling to the enemy. It was the third successful attack
within three weeks, and the Soviet Ambassador had been instructed by Moscow to use
whatever language necessary to get future attacks halted immediately.
Our Foreign Minister,
Sahibzada Yaqoob, was left in no doubt that if any further operation was
conducted in the Soviet Union the consequences for the security and integrity
of Pakistan would be dire. It was a threat of outright attack by the
Soviet military. That they used this threat was itself
confirmation that our raids were hurting. They were concerned,
not so much with the actual damage caused, but by the effect
they were having on the local Muslim population. If
the attacks were to continue unchecked it might not be long before they had
a general uprising on their hands. There was panic in our Foreign
Office. The Prime Minister was informed that Pakistan might be on the brink of
war, so he at once ordered General Gul who had recently replaced General
Akhtar at IS!, to cease all such operations at once.
Gul contacted me late at
night in Peshawar, where! had gone to plan some operations with the
Military Committee, telling me to halt these incursions immediately. I responded
that it was impossible. I was not in communication with all the Commanders
involved, and to pass on this order would take time. This infuriated
Gul, whose
head would roll if the Prime Minister’s instructions were not
obeyed, so he insisted that I confirm to him that these activities had been halted
by the morning. I could only repeat that it was impossible, but I added
that if any did take place no Commander or Party would claim the credit. I
told him I would endeavor to pass the message by the quickest means. I
myself felt that calling them all off indefinitely was hasty, as
we would lose the momentum. When I returned to Islamabad I tried to convince General
Gul the tremendous advantages of such operations. I did not want
to abandon our contacts and stop everything, just when we were obviously
hurting the Soviets. Of course, I spoke as a soldier, not a
politician, and I knew there was no way the Pakistan Army could
meet an all-out Soviet ground attack, but I believed they were
bluffing.
Even the CIA was shaken.
The local chief told me, Please don’t start a third world war by
conducting these operations inside Soviet territory’. There were
no more. Looking back I believe I was right; the Soviets would
never have launched an invasion of Pakistan. Within a few months
they had agreed to withdraw from Afghanistan, so I do not see
how Gorbachev would ever have escalated the conflict and brought
the world to the brink of a world war. It was surely the last
thing he wanted. I must acknowledge my limited wisdom in this
matter, but I feel that had General Akhtar still been in the
chair at ISI he would have allowed such operations to continue,
but at a lower key.
Be that as it may, these
attacks remain for me the high point of my career with 151. My
bureau was the only military headquarters in over 40 years to
have planned and coordinated military operations inside the
communist superpower. The great majority were successful; they
wounded the bar and they proved the effectiveness of well-led
guerrilla attacks to be out of all proportion to their size.
That the small-scale raids by such Commanders as Wall Beg could
influence the councils in the Kremlin was of itself a singular
reward.
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