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'Zia's death must
have been an act of God.' Benazir
Bhutto, Daughter of Destiny, 1988.
The Crash
When the camouflage-painted Pakistan Air Force C-130
transport aircraft hit the ground it did so at an angle of 65
degrees. It was nose-diving, flaps up, wings level, landing
gear up and locked, with all four engines functioning
normally. It impacted at 190 knots. After a brief moment a
monstrous ball of orange flame consumed it as the fuel tanks
exploded. Both clocks in the flight deck later showed 3.51 PM
exactly on a clear, bright day, a few miles north of the small
garrison town of Bahawalpur. Precisely five minutes earlier it
had lifted off at the start of its 70-minute flight to
Islamabad. After some two minutes of terror all on board had
the merciful relief of instantaneous oblivion.
It was 17 August, 1988. Moments before Hafiz Taj Mohammad,
who was walking towards his field near the village of Dhok
Kamal, near the Sutlej River eight miles north of Bahawalpur,
heard the roar of engines and looked up. He watched
incredulously as the lumbering plane, which was still rising
steadily through 5000 feet, suddenly dropped its nose to fly
almost straight at the ground, before, with some superhuman
effort, it climbed again. Then, as though its strength had
finally gone, it plunged down to extinction. To the man below
there was no outward reason, no missile, no mid-air explosion,
no fire, no engine trailing smoke, nothing to forewarn of such
a disaster.
Dead were the President of Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq,
and the man who might have succeeded him had he survived,
General Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Committee. Gone were the two most powerful men in
Pakistan, the head of state and the man who for eight years
until 1987, and headed the ISI. At a stroke the Afghan
resistance fighters, the Mujahideen, had lost their two most
influential champions. Dead were the US Ambassador, Mr. Arnold
Raphel, who had known the President for twelve years, and
Brigadier-General Herbert Wassom, the US Defense Attaché in
Islamabad. Dead also were eight Pakistani generals with their
staff, and the crew - thirty-one persons in all.
Disquietingly, neither President Zia nor General Akhtar
should have been abroad the plane. Both had been persuaded
against their wishes to attend a demonstration of a solitary
American M-I battle tank, which the US was keen to sell to the
Pakistan Army. It was not a function that required their
presence. Such a comparatively low-level event would normally
have been handled by the Vice Chief of Army Staff, General
Mirza Aslam Beg. It was the first time Zia had left the heavy
security of his official residence since he had dismissed the
government of Prime Minister Junejo three months before.
It was only on 14 August that Zia had finally given in to
the pressure from his former military secretary and Defense Attaché in Washington, Major-General Mehmood Durrani, now
commanding the armored division. He insisted that the
President's presence was diplomatically desirable, and would
give added weight to the Pakistani delegation. After all Zia
had retained the post of Chief of Army Staff. Against his
better judgment he agree to go.
Similarly, General Akhtar had no intention of going to
Bahawalpur until a mere twelve hours beforehand. His change of
mind was brought about by the persistent phone calls of a
former director in ISI, to the effect that Zia was about to
make some controversial changes in the military hierarchy
about which Akhtar should know. Akhtar consulted with the
President, asking for an urgent meeting. Zia, who was then
committed to the tank demonstration trip, suggested Akhtar
accompany him as they could discuss things on the aircraft.
The fate of both was sealed.
The callsign of the President's plane was PAK 1, but the
actual aircraft he would use was not selected until shortly
before the flight. Usually two of the C-130s based at the Air
Force base at Chaklala, a few miles from Islamabad, were
earmarked. Then, once the decision was taken, the VIP
passenger capsule could be rolled into the aircraft and
secured shortly before take off. This was a 21-foot-long by
8-foot-wide plywood and metal structure weighing 5000 pounds,
which was fitted out to give some comfort, including an
independent air conditioning and lighting system, to an
otherwise notoriously uncomfortable aircraft interior.
The second aircraft, PAK 2, would follow PAK 1 as a backup.
There was routine security search of both planes prior to
departure. For this flight there was a problem. The airstrip
at Bahawalpur was small and could only accommodate one C-130,
so PAK 2 would land 150 kilometers away at Sargodha. Once the
President left Chaklala there was no possibility of his
changing aircraft.
There would, however, be two other smaller planes on the
airfield. The first was the Cessna whose task was to circle
the vicinity of the airport as a precaution against
missile-armed terrorists. This had been routine practice since
an unsuccessful missile attack six years earlier. Then there
was the eight-seater plane of General Beg who, as the official
host, had to get the small jet that would take him and the
ambassador south would be parked at Multan. If the crash was
sabotage the two Americans were not part of the target.
The actual demonstration, in front of so much Army brass,
was a big embarrassment to the Americans. The much-vaunted
Abrams tank failed to score many hits and the billion dollar
deal evaporated in the enervating heat.
While the President and the senior officers ate lunch at
the officer's mess PAK 1 sat on the tarmac, baking in the sun.
An armed military guard was on duty around the aircraft, but
there had been a minor fault with a cargo door so the seven
crew technicians worked on it. The pilot, Wing Commander
Mash'hood Hussan, who had been personally selected by Zia,
together with his co-pilot, navigator and engineer, arrived
back at the plane for pre-flight checks in advance of the
passengers. These four men would be seated on the elevated
flight deck, which was separated from the VIP capsule by a
narrow door at the top of three steps, on the left side of the
aircraft.
Zia, with his party, arrived at around 3.30 p.m., and knelt
towards Mecca before saying his farewells. He had persuaded
both the senior US officials to join him for the return
flight. They did so with no apparent concern. General Beg made
excuses when the President tried to prevail upon him to board
PAK 1. He would use his own plane as he had business to attend
to at Lahore. It was a known practice of Zia's to fly with the
maximum number of top generals or officials to minimize the
risks of a sabotage plot. Shortly before departure two crates
of mangoes arrived for the VIPs, which were loaded in the rear
without any check, together with a case of model tanks.
Strapped into the sofa and easy chairs inside the VIP
capsule were Zia, Akhtar, Afzaal (Chief of the General Staff),
Raphel, Wassom, and the President's military secretary,
Brigadier General Najib Ahmed. Zia, Raphel and Akhtar sat
close together so they could chat during the flight, although
conversation is difficult as the C-130 is an excessively noisy
aircraft. At 3.46 p.m. PAK 1 lifted off after the Cessna
security plane reported nothing untoward. On the flight deck
the take off routine had been uneventful, with clear
communications to the control tower. The fact that the
aircraft lacked either a black box flight recorder or a
cockpit voice recorder would later be the subject of censure,
but at lift off none of the crew or passengers had the
slightest hint of the catastrophe that was little more than
two minutes away. Mash'hood gave his arrival time at Islamabad
over the radio as the plane pulled up onto the sky and began
to turn on to its correct course.
On the ground General Beg's pilot was preparing to take
off; at Sargodha PAK 2 was airborne, as was the Cessna. All
were on the same radio frequency as PAK 1, so all heard the
ground controller request PAK 1's estimated position, and the
response, 'Stand by'. Then nothing, no mayday call, total
silence, despite the increasingly frantic calls from the
control tower as it was realized that something was radically
wrong.
To the passengers the horror of the sickening plunge, with
bodies hanging by their safety belts, unable to move, screams
drowned by the uninterrupted roar of the engines, was
indescribable. Then, the sudden, few fleeting moments of
relief as the plane seemingly came under control and started
to climb again, with the occupants lolling in the opposite
direction or jammed hard back into their seats. But, finally,
yet another terrifying dive as PAK 1 gave up the struggle to
survive.
The Culprits
In Judicial terms it was either misadventure or murder.
When the news broke, the chances of finding any Pakistani who
believed it was an accident were a million to one against. Zia
was a man with umpteen enemies. There has been at least six
previous attempts at assassination, including a near miss by a
missile fired at his plane. Probably his most uncompromising
opponents within Pakistan were the Bhutto family. Zia had,
despite the international outcry to commute it, confirmed the
death sentence on the present Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's
father -- this, to the man who, as prime minister, had
personally picked Zia, then the most junior
lieutenant-general, for promotion of Chief of Army Staff over
the heads of his seniors. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had made a
decision that, three years later, he would pay for with his
head. On 4 April, 1979, he was hanged in Rawalpindi jail.
Thereafter the family feud was unrelenting. Zia imprisoned
Benazir Bhutto and her mother, banned Bhutto's political
party, and had his sons Shah Nawaz and Mir Murtaza convicted
of serious crimes in absentia. In exile Mir Murtaza
established an anti-Zia terrorist group named Al-Zulfikar (The
Sword) in Kabul, where it shared offices with the PLO. From
there, and Damascus, it carried out a campaign of killing and
sabotage which, in 1981, included the hijacking of a Pakistan
International Airlines passenger jet. Then, in 1985, Shah
Nawaz died a painful death in sinister circumstances in Paris,
it being rumoured that he had been poisoned by Zia's agents.
There was, and still is, an implacable hatred between these
two families. Benazir Bhutto claimed the crash was 'An act of
God', before going on to win the general election three months
later, to become Pakistan's first woman prime minister.
Zia was a military man who, along with Akhtar, was the last
officer to have been commissioned from the Indian Military
Academies just before the partition of India in 1947. Once in
politics he would often boast that 'The Armed Forces are my
constituency' and he never vacated the post of Chief of Army
Staff that Bhutto had given him. But even within the military
he had few friends. He quickly developed an uncanny knack of
spotting potential rivals for power. These were removed from
the scene by sacking, or posting to positions well away from
the political centre at Islamabad. His only role as Chief of
Army Staff had been to vet the promotions and postings of all
officers to the rank of major-general or above. Numerous
disgruntled Service chiefs were secretly delighted that Zia
was dead.
Potential assassins were not restricted to Pakistanis. Ever
since Zia had backed the Mujahideen in their struggle against
the Soviets and their Afghan allies, Pakistan had been swamped
with KHAD agents bent on undermining his government by a
terror campaign of bombing civilians. KHAD is the Afghan
secret police organization, trained and advised by the KGB. At
the top of its hit list was President Zia, closely followed by
General Akhtar. The Soviets were withdrawing from Afghanistan
solely because Zia and given sanctuary to the Mujahideen and
had, for nine years, been arming, training and advising them
in a bloody guerrilla war that had cost the Soviet military
13,000 lives. The USSR blamed Pakistan for continuing to
encourage and supply the Mujahideen in their attacks during
the withdrawal, which was half-completed at the time of the
crash. It had gone so far as to warn Pakistan, through the US
Ambassador in Moscow, that it intended to teach Zia a lesson.
Then there was India. Pakistanis and Indians had
slaughtered each other on three separate occasions, in 1947,
1965 and 1971. India's Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandhi was
convinced that Zia was supplying weapons to Sikh terrorists.
They had murdered his mother, and now several thousand armed
Sikh insurgents were active in India. Zia was accused of
meeting their leaders, and giving shelter and training to the
guerrillas inside Pakistan. To counter this, Delhi had
established a special branch of its Intelligence Service, with
the unpretentious title of the Research and Analysis Wing
(RAW), specifically targeted on Pakistan.
Even the US government shed few genuine tears at Zia's
death. It was the State Department's belief that Zia had
outlived his use fullness. With the Soviets leaving
Afghanistan, the last thing the US wanted was for communist
rule in Kabul to be replaced by an Islamic fundamentalist one.
American officials were convinced that this was Zia's aim.
According to them his dream was an Islamic power block
stretching from Iran through Afghanistan to Pakistan with,
eventually, the Uzbek, Turkoman and Tajik provinces of the
USSR included. To the State Department such a huge area shaded
green on the map would be worse than Afghanistan painted red.
On the very day of the disaster the Pakistan Chief of Air
Staff ordered a Board of Inquiry set up to inquire into the
circumstances of the crash, assess damage and costs, apportion
blame (if any) and make recommendations to avoid similar
occurrences in the future. Air Commodore Abbas Mirza presided,
with three other senior Pakistan Air Force (PAF) officers
sitting as members. To provide technical advice and expertise
six USAF officers were hurriedly flown from Europe to join the
inquiry. They were led by Colonel Daniel Sowada.
For two months the Board deliberated and sifted evidence.
Witnesses were interviewed, while exhaustive laboratory tests
were carried out regarding the aircraft structure, instruments
engines, propellers, and flight controls, both in Pakistan and
the USA, with the full cooperation of Lockheed, the aircraft's
manufacturers. One after another possible causes of the crash
were eliminated with meticulous care. Crew fitness, fatigue
and stress were ruled out. There had been no pilot error.
Adverse weather was not a factor, nor was fuel contamination.
No in-flight fire had occurred prior to impact; the aircraft
was structurally intact when it hit the ground; there was no
metal fatigue; engines and propellers were functioning
normally, as were hydraulic fluid, electrical power and
control cables. No evidence of a high-intensity internal
explosion was found. Finally, no missile or rocket had been
used to down the plane. The inevitable conclusion -- a
criminal act of sabotage had killed thirty-one people.
The board was of the opinion that the crew in the cockpit
had been instantaneously and simultaneously incapacitated by
the use of a chemical agent such as fast-working nerve gas.
The presence of an odorless and colorless gas would not
alarm the crew, so they would not don helmets and masks to
breathe oxygen. It was established that none of the flight
crew was wearing helmets at the time of the crash. The Board
commented that such a chemical agent could have been packed in
a small innocuous container such as a drink can, thermos flask
or gift parcel, and smuggled onboard without arousing
suspicion.
It was not possible to substantiate the type of gas used as
'no proper autopsies on the flight deck crew were carried
out'. Only the body of Brigadier Wassom was examined
before the authorities at the military hospital at Bahawalpur
were ordered not to perform autopsies. He had been in the VIP
capsule, not on the flight deck, and all that could be deduced
was that he had not suffered injuries from any explosion prior
to impact. Neither had he breathed in any toxic fumes, as
would have been the case with a fire before the plane hit the
ground. The instructions not to perform autopsies came as a
shock, as it was a routine procedure. Later, it was stated
that all the bodies had been completely destroyed in the fire,
rendering autopsies impossible. When General Akhtar's family
wanted to see his body before burial, they were refused, on
the grounds that it was totally disintegrated, with nothing of
any substance left.
The reason was not believed. Witnesses at the crash site
said that, while the passengers at the rear of the aircraft
were virtually totally destroyed, this was not the case with
the senior officers in the capsule or the crew in the cockpit.
The condition of Wassom's body did not prevent thorough
examination. Zia's Holy Koran survived, charred but easily recognizable, as did Akhtar's uniform cap, together with his
personal file cover with its crest, and the words 'CHAIRMAN
JCSC' still clearly readable. A US official was to announce
that the bodies were not available for autopsy as Muslim
custom requires burial within 24 hours. While this is true in
normal circumstances, it never applies within the Services, as
shown by the Army medical staff at Bahawalpur when they
automatically made preparations to proceed.
The Board had no members qualified to undertake criminal
investigations, but they did record that, 'although 31 death
certificates have been received no physical body count was
carried out at the wreckage site or in the hospital. The
possibility of someone not boarding the aircraft at Bahawalpur
cannot be ruled out'.
Although the ISI was initially tasked with investigations,
its efforts appeared less than enthusiastic. Service personnel
at Bahawalpur were surprised that they were not subjected to
rigorous interrogation. The discovery of a murdered policeman
nearby was not successfully investigated, while the efforts of
interrogators to extract a confession from the pilot of PAK 2
were bizarre, as well as unrewarding. A recent killing of a
Shiite leader had been blamed by his followers on Zia. Both
the pilot of PAK 2 and co-pilot of PAK 1, Flight Lieutenant
Sajid, were Shiites, so it was suggested that the PAK 2 pilot
had persuaded Sajid deliberately to crash the plane in a
suicide mission. Only when the Board of Inquiry showed that
such actions would have been physically impossible was the
unfortunate man released.
So it was an act of mass murder. The likely method was
pinpointed by the Board, although the culprits remained
unidentified. As explained above, many people, organizations,
even nations, had powerful personal or political motives for
wanting Zia removed. What has gone before are the facts as far
as I have been able to ascertain them; what follows are my own
comments on how it might have been done.
First, I will deal with the point sometimes made that the
violent roller-coaster movements of the aircraft indicated a
last despairing attempt by somebody to fly the plane. If it
had been a crew member he would certainly have shouted some
warning over the radio, but there was absolute silence.
Assuredly the crew were incapacitated. Afterwards it was
suggested that the voice of Brigadier Najib Ahmed had been
heard calling out to the captain, and that he had managed to
get into the cockpit where his cries had been picked up on the
radio as the pilot's hand was still locked to the switch. One
version of this theory has Najib actually trying to control
the aircraft. I believe this is nonsensical. Once PAK 1 got
out of control there was no way anybody could physically leave
his seat and struggle forward, climb the steps, open the door
and get onto the flight deck. Finally, there is no mention of
anyone hearing Ahmed's voice in the Board of Inquiry's report.
Had such a thing happened it would have been there. The
erratic climbing and plunging has another explanation.
According to a Lockheed C-130 expert, if this type of aircraft
flies unattended its nose rises steeply, a mechanism in the
tail reverses this and the plane dives. The plane
over-corrects, again with the same results. This might occur
several times before a crash. The technical term for this
pattern is 'phugoid'.
I believe the primary air was to assassinate Zia. The
original plan may have been to murder Akhtar as well, and at
the same time, but I doubt it. It was really asking a lot to
kill them simultaneously. Akhtar was detested by many senior
officers, he was near the top of KHAD's his list, and he was
assumed by many to be ready to step into Zia's position if he
died. Perhaps it was part of the plot to get him on board PAK
1 that afternoon, but if so it was a very last-minute
arrangement. On balance I feel his death was probably regarded
as an unexpected bonus by the killers.
Certainly the use of a plane crash was selected as the
means because the chances of evidence to incriminate the
plotters surviving would be minimal even if it was later
established as sabotage. The use of ultra-sophisticated poison
gas, capable of killing four crewmembers simultaneously,
points to the involvement of at least one intelligence agency.
The problem would be the source of the gas. Pakistan would be
unlikely to have it, but the KGB and CIA would surely have
access. Both KHAD and RAW could have obtained it through their
Soviet contacts. If the conspirators were among the Pakistan
military then it is conceivable that the CIA could have
supplied it, albeit for another purpose.
Also highly probable is the involvement of the Pakistan
military, certainly at comparatively junior level, probably at
senior as well. Neither the KGB nor KHAD or RAW could have
halted the autopsies at a military hospital. With military
involvement, the obtaining of the President's flight schedule
becomes comparatively simple, as does getting around security
at airports, and the actual planting of the device inside an
aircraft.
The planners must have been getting desperate as week after
week passed without Zia showing any inclination to use his
plane. The tank demonstration was not likely to interest him
without considerable persuasion, and was probably used as a
last resort. The problem was to convince him to go without
making him suspicious. Quite possibly somebody convinced
General Durrani, the tank division commander, that Zia's
attendance would add to the importance of the event, and was
in Durrani's own interests. His subsequent success in inducing
the President to go could have been entirely innocent.
We must assume that the lethal gas device had already been
obtained while awaiting an opportunity, and the person
destined to plant it given his instructions. He was
undoubtedly in the military, probably a technician within the
Air Force, possibly, if my theory is correct, from No.6
Squadron PAF. This is the unit that operates the C-130
transports out of Chaklala a few miles south of Islamabad. A
decision had to be taken as to when to plant the gas. Once it
was confirmed that Zia would fly to Bahawalpur the choice lay
between doing it there or at Chaklala, when it was clear
exactly which aircraft would be PAK 1.
Most theories suggest the planting of the device was done
at Bahawalpur, but I believe it much more likely to have been
Chaklala. At Bahawalpur there would be no Air Force personnel
except the crew, so none of them would do it - unless they
were willing to go down with the plane. How could the plotters
be sure an Army man could get on the guarded aircraft? The
device had to be put in the cockpit which involved climbing up
the steps, through the door, on to the flight deck. This was
virtually impossible for a soldier, and certainly did not
happen with the mango delivery. The crew working on the cargo
door perhaps? But they were to fly back to Islamabad. Neither
they nor the security guard would allow a soldier or civilian
into the aircraft, let alone go climbing up into the cockpit.
I cannot say with absolute certainty it was not done at
Bahawalpur, but if it was it was a highly risky operation with
the odds against success.
At Chaklala an intelligence agency would have an easier
task in infiltrating the permanent Air Force staff. Access to
the C-130s was part of the everyday duties of the technical or
maintenance personnel. A perfect opportunity occurred when the
VIP capsule was rolled up inside PAK 1. It identified the
aircraft and, with the bustle of activity in strapping it to
the floor and pre-flight checks, nobody would have questioned
anybody going into the cockpit, perhaps changing a fire
extinguisher or inserting the device in an airvent. If the
sabotage was carried out at Chaklala then it would have needed
two devices to set it off -- a timer and an altitude device.
The timer would be set to activate the altitude switch. With
the former a four-hour time lapse would be safe, allowing for
one hour before the plane took off, just over an hour's
flight, and then as PAK 1 sat on the strip at Bahawalpur the
altitude device would be armed. All that was needed would be
the climb to the required height, then inside the cockpit the
deadly gas would escape. If Chaklala was the scene of the
sabotage then it was a double-arming device that was used,
otherwise PAK 1 would have crashed shortly after take-off and
suspicion would have been focused on the Air Force base
personnel.
The plot worked flawlessly, except for one major calamity:
both the US Ambassador and the military attaché died.
Certainly, whoever carried out this multiple murder had not
intended these two senior Americans to be among the victims.
There was no way of knowing that Zia would invite them to join
him for the journey at the last minute. The conspirators were
appalled. They anticipated the most thorough, penetrating and
wide-ranging investigation, which would undoubtedly uncover
their identities. It never happened. The final phase of this
merciless terrorist act was the US cover-up.
The Cover-up
The State Department would have much preferred an
accident, some sort of technical failure, pilot error,
anything rather than sabotage. If it was murder of two
high-ranking US officials then the American public would
expect, indeed demand, to know the culprits. For such an
outrageous act of terrorism the outcry against the
perpetrators would be loud and long. The government would
probably find it impossible to silence the clamor to exact
retribution. Depending on who had done it, exposure could mean
the ruin of US policy objectives in the area, and elsewhere in
the world.
Supposing the KGB, or their surrogates in KHAD, were
responsible, how would revealing the USSR as the organizer of
mass murder, of the assassination of a head of state, affect
the build-up of goodwill between East and West? How could the
US avoid a major outbreak of hostility between themselves and
the USSR? Almost certainly the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan would be reversed. The implications of Moscow
being to blame were unnerving.
Similarly, the dilemma was almost as serious if the
plotters were within the Pakistan military. If investigation
uncovered a clique of anti-Zia generals the American people
would be outraged that, after all these years of massive
support to the Pakistan Armed Forces and the Mujahideen, they
had killed a US ambassador and a brigadier-general. It would
be futile to say they hadn't intended to! US-Pakistan
relations would be in ruins. Aid would have to be curtailed,
the military might be forced into prolonged presidential rule,
the democratic elections scheduled for November would be
abandoned, and with them the prospect of the more acceptably
moderate Benazir Bhutto becoming prime minister. As I have
said earlier, the US was not sorry to see Zia go. The State
Department was happy to see the Soviets out of Afghanistan,
but decidedly unhappy with the likelihood of, as the US
perceived it, Zia backed fundamentalists talk over in Kabul.
Nor did it like his determination to have nuclear weapons. By
mid-1988 Zia was becoming a liability rather than an asset to
the US.
Though unlikely, it was conceivable that some minor
political faction or terrorist group. like Al-Zulfikar, had
somehow achieved the impossible. The problem was, once serious
investigations started there was no knowing what unwelcome
worms might emerge from the can as the lid was lifted.
Testifying before the House of Representatives Judiciary
Sub-Committee on Crime in June, 1989, Assistant Secretary of
Defense Richard Armitage justified the lack of any serious
investigations into the sabotage by claiming, '[we were]
hopefully moving Pakistan in a more democratic manner.... The
military in Pakistan as well as their presidency just being
decapitated, we were very alarmed there might be some
backsliding'. In other words they were quite prepared to write
off Ambassador Raphel's and Brigadier Wassom's murders if that
meant not rocking the boat.
None of this soul-searching would have been necessary if no
Americans had died -- particularly such senior ones. The whole
business was complicated by the fact that as recently as 1986
Congress had passed a law that gave the FBI the legal right,
indeed the duty, to inquire into terrorist acts overseas that
involved attacks on US citizens. It is often referred to as
the 'Long Arm' law.
The State Department did four things immediately after the
crash which, taken together, point unerringly at a cover-up.
First, within hours, it sent a team of purely technical
airforce advisers to assist the PAF Board of Inquiry.
Secondly, it did not insist, through its embassy, on autopsies
on the bodies of the victims, particularly the crew, but
rather allowed them to be buried knowing that essential
evidence as to how the crash was caused was being buried with
them. Thirdly, it sent a Deputy National Security Adviser,
Robert Oakley, to take over Raphel's post. He could be relied
upon to sit on the lid of the can. Later, in June, 1989, he
told a highly skeptical sub-committee that when he attended
the National Security Council meeting to decide on the US
response to the crash, he simply forgot all about the 'Long
Arm' law. This, despite the fact that he had personally
lobbied hard to get it passed. Fourthly, and most importantly,
it vetoed the FBI's request clearance and on 21 August had
been given it verbally, but, within hours, it had been
withdrawn -- probably on the instructions of Oakley, who was
by then in Islamabad.
General Beg, who had just avoided dying with his President,
had circled the burning wreckage in his own aircraft before
flying straight to Islamabad. There troops were alerted, key
points protected, and a crisis cabinet meeting called. But
there was no military takeover. Beg accepted immediate
promotion to Zia's old post of Army Chief of Staff, while the
civilian chairman of the Senate, the 73-year-old Ghulam Ishaq
Khan, took over as head of the interim government. The
November election would go ahead.
Almost certainly the military authority that halted the
autopsies will never be named, nor will the details of the
collusion that must have taken place so swiftly between the
Pakistani authorities and the US Embassy in Islamabad. It was
not until ten months later that congressional pressure finally
forced the State Department to allow three FBI investigators
to go to Pakistan. As Congressman Bill Mclollum (R. Fla.)
said, 'At this late date, can the FBI find out what actually
happened in Pakistan? I don't know. But we intend to find out
what happened at the State Department'. The FBI team seemingly
lacked enthusiasm for the task. It was reported that 'awkward'
questions were not asked; the agents appeared disinclined to
investigate evidence that conflicted with the statement that
the bodies were too badly burned to permit autopsies and, with
their schedule arranged by the Bhutto government, were
apparently more interested in sightseeing than
cross-questioning witnesses. According to a Washington Times
source they only left Islamabad for tourist trips. Their
attitude made it quite clear that they were following
instructions not to stir the pot.
There was much hypocrisy in high places at the funeral on
20 August, 1988. India had sent its President and declared
national mourning at home, the Russian Ambassador laid a
wreath with solemn ceremonial, while US Secretary of State
George Schultz called Zia a 'martyr' and assured the
Mujahideen fundamentalist Leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, that
the US would do all it could to ensure their success in
freeing Afghanistan. The funeral had both a military and an
Islamic flavour. Hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis gathered
near the gold-plated Faisal Mosque to watch the coffin,
covered in the national flag and flowers, and carried on the
shoulders of soldiers, arrive for the final rites. Prayers
were followed by the measured boom of a 21-gun salute.
There was genuine sorrow and foreboding among the three
million Afghan refugees encamped just inside the Pakistan
border. There was a great sense of loss among the Mujahideen,
for Zia and Akhtar had been the architects of their successes
in the field. Now, with the Soviets withdrawing, with victory
in sight, continued, uninterrupted support would be
indispensable for the final push to Kabul. As the reader will
discover the Mujahideen were to be bitterly disappointed. |